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I. INTRODUCTION
"We've been sued where? By whom?" Not pleased by the news reported
by the voice on the other end of the line, Riley Clinton, Assistant General
Counsel for McAfee, Inc., leaned back in his chair and began to think
through his options while Will Daniels, McAfee's outside patent counsel,
continued. The details of the new lawsuit interrupted Riley's private strategy
session.
"What! You've got to be kidding me. They were incorporated when?"
McAfee had just been sued in a federal court in West Virginia by
Information Protection and Authentication of West Virginia-a "patent
troll," as they are affectionately referred to in the patent world, established
just weeks prior to the filing of the present suit. 1
"What's their angle in West Virginia? They've never hit us there before.
We don't have anything there: no documents, no facilities, no people,
nothing." Riley thought aloud, "They're probably shopping; looking for the
next rocket docket. What do we know about the judges in the district?
Nothing? Really?"
"Okay, fine. Find out what you can about the judges, but in the
meantime, let's make a motion to transfer venue to either the Northern
District of Texas or the Northern District of California. Will, we have no
business in a West Virginia court. Making trips to Charleston isn't my idea
of a vacation. If our motion is denied, will Volkswagen help us in the Fourth
Circuit?"2
"I'm not sure. The law on this is all screwed up. I'll look into it and get
back to you," replied Will.
"Alright," sighed Riley. "Let's just make this go away as quickly as
possible." Riley hung up, rubbed his temples, and hoped Will could find
something to get them out of West Virginia.3
1 A "patent troll" is "a small company who enforces patent rights against accused
infringers in an attempt to collect licensing fees, but does not manufacture products or
supply services based on the patents in question." IntemetAd Sys., LLC v. Opodo, Ltd.,
481 F. Supp. 2d 596, 601 (N.D. Tex. 2007).
2 In re Volkswagen of America (Volkswagen I), Inc. 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008)
(en banc).
3 This fact pattern is loosely based on the case of Information Protection and
Authentication of West Virginia, LLC v. McAfee, Inc.. The case was a patent infringement
suit filed in the Southern District of West Virginia. McAfee did make a motion to transfer
venue to the Northern District of California under § 1404(a), the motion was granted, and
the case was subsequently dismissed with prejudice. The names of the attorneys have
been changed. See Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, Info. Prot. and Authentication of
W. Va., LLC v. McAfee, Inc., No. 5:09CV05421 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 9,2010).
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Conversations like the one between Riley and Will frequently take place
in the opening stages of civil cases, and choices made in these early
conversations may prove to be among the most significant decisions in the
life cycle of the lawsuit. The pre-trial disputes at the center of these early
choices dominate modem litigation because few civil cases are tried. 4 The
vast majority of cases settle-or are adjudicated by non-trial methods-long
before a jury is empanelled. 5
Venue disputes are particularly significant and bitter, and any litigator
worth his or her salt will tell you that where a case is litigated is crucial to the
success or failure of the action.6 In a civil case, the plaintiff makes the initial
4 From 1962 to 2002 the percentage of federal civil cases that ended in a trial
plummeted from 11.5 percent to 1.8 percent. See ROBERT P. BURNS, THE DEATH OF THE
AMERICAN TRIAL 82 (2009). See generally Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An
Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004). Regarding the extinction of the trial, legal historian Lawrence
Friedman has commented that "[t]he trial as the normal way to deal with litigation,
especially civil litigation, was doomed to decline, and perhaps even vanish, and probably
nothing can stop the process." See Lawrence M. Friedman, The Day Before Trials
Vanished, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 689, 703 (2004).
5 See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements,
NonTrial Adjudications and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal
Civil Cases, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705 (2004) (analyzing the decline in the
American civil trial by investigating the "disposition" coding of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts in order to determine how the cases filed are disposed
of if not by trial).
6 Venue in the federal courts is determined by 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2006). Change of
venue is generally governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). On the importance of venue see
Christopher D. Cameron & Kevin R. Johnson, Death of a Salesman? Forum Shopping
and Outcome Determination Under International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 769, 776-
77 (1995) ("[A]s suggested by the old adage about the 'home-field advantage,' the
location of the forum adjudicating a dispute is critically important. Litigators are well
aware of the careful maneuvering over where a lawsuit will proceed and believe-rightly
or wrongly-that the answer to the 'where' question may drastically impact the ultimate
outcome of the case."); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of
Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1507, 1511-12 (1995) (observing, based on
empirical evidence, that the location of litigation is influential in the outcome of that
litigation); see also Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for
Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 252-55 (1991)
(arguing the importance of forum on the outcome of the case including that "[o]nce it is
conceded that a forum has judicial jurisdiction, that forum unavoidably controls or
determines the result in that case between the parties before it."); Frederic X. Shadley &
Linda E. Maichl, The Jurisdictional Aspects of Litigation Involving International Clients,
45 FED. INS. & CORP. COuNS. Q. 113, 141 (1995) ("[T]he forum chosen may have a
substantial impact on the outcome of the litigation."). But see Bruce Posnak, The Court
Doesn't Know Its Asahi From Its Wortman: A Critical View of the Constitutional
Constraints on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 41 SYRACUSE L. REv. 875, 876-79, 899
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decision to place the case in a particular forum.7 Forum is a strategic choice,
and an early misstep could cost the plaintiff his case. 8 Because plaintiffs will
choose the forum most beneficial to them, the defendant may respond with a
motion for change of venue. Parties vigorously contest motions for transfer
of venue because the defendant is attempting to overcome the plaintiff's
original choice of venue thus depriving the plaintiff of some perceived
advantage. 9 And, "[v]enue is worth fighting over because outcome often
turns on forum. When the dust settles, the case does too-but on terms that
reflect the results of the skirmishing."' 0 Thus, though a change of venue is
theoretically "but a change of courtrooms," clearly, something more-
potentially the outcome of the case-is at stake when a motion to transfer is
filed. l l
With disputes over venue being such an important aspect of pretrial
litigation, one would assume that judicial decisions regarding venue, like
other important judicial decisions in litigation, are subject to appellate
review. And they are-sort of.
& n.130 (1990) (suggesting that the choice of law is more outcome-determinative than
the jurisdictional decision).
7 See FED. R. Cw. P. 3.
8 Consider, for example, a hypothetical case involving a client who suffers serious
injury when she slips and falls on a wet surface inside a restaurant in Miami, Florida. The
client is from Ohio and wishes to sue the restaurant for her injuries. Further, assume that
the client wishes to invoke the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts. In which
federal court should the lawsuit be brought? A mistake in choosing the forum at this point
in the case could be outcome determinative. Under Florida law, plaintiffs in slip-and-fall
lawsuits bear a lower burden of proof than plaintiffs in other states, including Ohio, and
therefore because the federal court in Florida, under Erie, would apply state tort law, the
lawsuit should be brought in Florida in order to take advantage of the lower burden.
Compare Owens v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 802 So. 2d. 315, 331 (Fla. 2001)
(eliminating the specific requirement that the plaintiff establish that the business had
constructive knowledge of the existence of a foreign substance on the floor in order to
state a prima facie case), with Omdorff v. ALDI, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 1298, 1300 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1996) (noting that in slip-and-fall cases plaintiffs must prove that the defendant
either placed a hazardous substance on the floor or had actual or constructive knowledge
of its presence); see also AMERICAN TORT REFORM FOUNDATION, JUDICIAL HELLHOLES
2009/2010 at iii, http://judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/2010 report.pdf
(last visited Feb. 25, 2011) (naming South Florida as the number four "judicial hellhole"
for defendants).
9 Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1514 ("The most powerful explanation for
the transfer effect involves forum-shopping: the plaintiffs' win rate declines because the
plaintiff has lost a forum advantage.").
ld. at 1508.
11 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
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Judicial decisions on motions to transfer venue are interlocutory in nature
and therefore, by definition, not immediately appealable.1 2 Though some
circuits may allow review of a district court's disposition on a transfer
motion through the discretionary interlocutory review provided by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b), 13 such review is uncommon because lower courts rarely seek
review of their own discretion. 14 Mandamus, therefore, provides the only
meaningful review of a trial court's ruling on a transfer motion. 15
Mandamus is an extreme remedy, 16 and the propriety of using this
mechanism to review transfer orders is disputed. 17 In some instances,
mandamus review of transfer orders is unobjectionable; the review is
conducted, and the writ issues with little fanfare. For example, when a
district judge acts beyond the scope of her jurisdiction in ruling on the
motion, the issuance of a writ of mandamus to constrain the judge to her
12 See In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 300 F.3d 368, 378 (3d Cir. 2002) ("It is a
well-established rule in this circuit (and generally) that orders transferring venue are not
immediately appealable.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006) (allowing discretionary review of interlocutory
orders where the district judge is "of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that
an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation. ").
14 See Charles J. Roedersheimer, Recent Cases, Federal Civil Procedure-Change
of Venue-Mandamus To Appeal Denial of Transfer Order Refused, 35 U. CIN. L. REV.
115, 117 (1966); see also Comment, Discretionary Appeals of District Court
Interlocutory Orders: A Guided Tour Through Section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code, 69
YALE L.J. 333, 346 (1959).
15 "Meaningful review" is distinguished here from "any review" because it is
possible and permissible to appeal a transfer ruling upon final judgment. See, e.g., Action
Indus. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 358 F.3d 337, 340 (5th Cir. 2004). However, appeal
from final judgment has very little potential to succeed. In In re National Presto
Industries, Judge Posner implied that, in almost all cases, appeal from an "adverse final
judgment" would be futile because the petitioner "would not be able to show that it
would have won the case had it been tried in a [different] forum." See In re Nat'l Presto
Indus., 347 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of Am.,
408 F.2d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1969) ("Alternatively, and perhaps more persuasively, it may be
that the abuse [of discretion on a transfer order] is not susceptible to correction on appeal
and, by postponing review, courts are denying effective appeal."); Note, Appealability of
1404(a) Orders: Mandamus Misapplied, 67 YALE L.J. 122, 124 (1957) (arguing that
appeal of a § 1404(a) ruling upon fimal judgment does not provide litigants with adequate
protection).
16 See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976) ("The
remedy of mandamus is a drastic one."); Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 107 (1967)
("The preemptory common-law writs are among the most potent weapons in the judicial
arsenal.").
17 See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction is uncontroversial. 18 However, mandamus jurisprudence allows
the writ to issue not only when the district judge has "usurped power," but
also when she has clearly abused her discretion. 19 There is sharp
disagreement within the circuits regarding whether and to what extent
mandamus review may be called upon to review a district judge's
discretionary decision to grant or deny a motion to transfer venue.20 The law
on this point exists in a state of chaos, leaving an important-and possibly
outcome-determinative- judicial decision in the litigation process subject to
haphazard and inconsistent review.
The 1948 enactment of the transfer statute generated much debate in the
1950s and early 1960s over whether mandamus was available to review
transfer orders for abuse of discretion. 21 The conversation waned, however,
after a line of Supreme Court decisions counseled for restrictive use of the
mandamus power, and many of the circuit courts adopted conservative, yet
different, standards regarding the availability and use of mandamus. 22 For
over fifty years the issue existed in a state of settled disarray. A recent string
of cases from the Fifth Circuit, and a series of rulings from the Federal
Circuit applying the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit, however, departed from
the conservative norm, issued mandamus to remedy a district court's abuse
of discretion on a § 1404(a) transfer order, and once again made this question
one of modem relevance. 23
Moreover, whether circuit courts may review the discretion of district
courts exercised on § 1404(a) motions with mandamus significantly
18 See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
19 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004).
20 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3855 (3d. ed. 2007).
21 See, e.g., In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 176-77 (1st Cir. 1954); All States
Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d Cir. 1952); Ford Motor Co. v. Ryan,
182 F.2d 329, 330 (2d Cir. 1950); A. James Roberts III, Comment, Mandamus
Proceedings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: A Compromise With Finality, 52 CAL. L.
REV. 1036, 1036-39 (1964). See generally Note, supra note 15.
22 The line of Supreme Court cases referred to began with La Buy v. Howes Leather
Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957), and included Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964),
and Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967); see also Roedersheimer, supra note 14, at
119 (noting that the writ of mandamus, while it had been issued previously, had not been
issued to correct an abuse of discretion on a transfer order since the Supreme Court's
decision in La Buy).
23 See, e.g., In re Genentech, Inc., 566 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re
Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Nintendo Co., 589
F.3d 1194, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed.
Cir. 2009); Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d 304, 308-09 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc); In re
Horseshoe Entm't, 337 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2003).
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influences a substantial number of cases in the federal system. 24 Precise
records revealing the number of transfer motions filed each year or the
percentage of cases in which transfer motions are filed do not exist.25
However, "research suggests that transfer motions are filed in a small but
sizeable and stable number of [] cases" and "transfer motions appear to
constitute a sizeable portion of the federal district court docket. '26 Professors
Eisenberg and Clermont conducted the most thorough study of § 1404(a)
transfer motions to date and concluded, in part, that the number of transfer
motions filed each year is increasing, and that that increase is "part of a
gentle long-term upward trend" that may indicate an increased need for
§ 1404(a)'s mechanism.27 Thus, whether the dispositions on the substantial
number of transfer motions filed each year may be reviewed for abuse of
discretion by way of mandamus in the circuit courts, and if so, the scope and
standard of that review, will have an impact on the federal courts that is not
insignificant.
This Note proposes that, although the law in the circuits regarding
whether and to what extent a circuit court may avail itself of mandamus in
order to review a transfer order entered under § 1404(a) may appear to be
chaotic, the decisions in which the writ has issued in review of such orders
contain threads of similarity-the protection of five identifiable interests.
Based on these mandamus-provoking circumstances, this Note proposes
statutory language providing for trans-jurisdictional mandamus review when
the ruling of a district court implicates one or more of the identified interests
or a similarly important interest.
Part II of this Note briefly considers the legislative history of, and
jurisprudence regarding, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651.28 Section 1404(a) empowers district courts to transfer cases to
24 See Brief of Civil Procedure Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12, Richard Singleton v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 129
S. Ct. 1336 (2009) (No. 08-745) [hereinafter Brief of Civil Procedure Law Professors]
(whether mandamus is available to review transfer orders for abuse of discretion "has the
potential to impact any case in which a transfer motion is filed").
25 Id.
26 Id. at 12, 13.
27 See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1526. Professors Eisenberg and
Clermont used data regarding the number of cases terminated in a given year that arrived
at the district court by way of transfer from another district combined with their estimated
success rate for transfer motions, and estimated that "roughly ten thousand" transfer
motions are filed each year. Id. at 1529. Another estimate reveals that the number of
transfer motions filed each year may be as high as 11,571. See Brief of Civil Procedure
Law Professors, supra note 24, at 13.
28 See discussion infra Part I.
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other district courts,29 and § 1651 cloaks the circuit courts with the power to
review the decisions of the district courts in limited circumstances including
when they transfer cases to other districts. 30 Additionally, Part II introduces
the considerable confusion regarding the circuit court's ability to review
transfer decisions of district courts made under § 1404(a) for abuse of
discretion by way of their mandamus power conferred in the All Writs Act.
Part III of this Note examines the decisions in which circuit courts have
issued a writ of mandamus to correct a district court's abuse of discretion on
a transfer order issued under § 1404(a), and identifies a measure of coherence
previously unnoticed in those decisions by identifying five common interests
that repeatedly appear to trigger the issuance of the writ.31
Because the circuit courts have demonstrated their willingness to protect
the interests identified as "triggering events" in Part III, Part IV proposes
statutory language that would provide trans-jurisdictional review of
§ 1404(a) orders for abuse of discretion when one or more of the identified
interests, or similarly valuable interests, are jeopardized by a district court's
transfer motion ruling.32
II. BACKGROUND
A. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
28 U.S.C. § 1404 is the main transfer of venue statute in the United
States Code.33 The subsection relevant here, § 1404(a), states in its entirety:
"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
29 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
30 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006); Caleshu v. Wangelin, 549 F.2d 93, 96 (8th Cir. 1977)
("The use of the mandamus power conferred on this Court by the All Writs Statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1651, is a proper remedy to correct an erroneous transfer.").
31 See discussion infra Part III.
32 See discussion infra Part IV.
33 See 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 20, § 3842. It is appropriate to
note that while § 1404(a) is the main transfer of venue provision, there are others. See,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1406, 1407, 1631 (2006). For example, § 1406 addresses the situation
where venue has been laid improperly and instructs the district court to either dismiss the
suit, or, if transfer is "in the interest of justice," to transfer the case to a proper venue. 28
U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2006). A question regarding whether mandamus is appropriate to
review transfer orders issued under § 1406(a), rather than under § 1404(a), also exists.
See generally Carolyn Kelly MacWilliam, Mandamus, Prohibition, or Interlocutory
Appeal as Proper Remedy to Seek Review of District Court's Disposition of Motion for
Change of Venue Under § 1404(a) or § 1406(a) of Judicial Code, 28 A.L.R. FED. 2d 311
(2008). That question, though related to the present inquiry, is distinct from it, and this
Note addresses only the § 1404(a) question. See id § 19 (noting distinctions between
§ 1404(a) and § 1406(a)).
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district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division
where it might have been brought."'34
Section 1404(a)'s provision of a method for transferring an action from a
federal district with proper venue to another, more convenient, federal
district was novel at the time of its enactment. 35 Prior to § 1404(a), a federal
court had the option of employing the doctrine of forum non conveniens to
dismiss a suit brought in a proper, but inconvenient, district, but had no
mechanism with which to transfer a case to a more appropriate venue while
retaining it in the federal system.36 Some commentators argue that a transfer
provision would have served little purpose prior to 1948 due to "the narrow
interpretation of personal jurisdiction embraced in the late nineteenth
century" which typically limited a plaintiff to "bring[ing] suit only in the
defendant's state of domicile" thereby precluding plaintiffs from filing in an
inconvenient forum.37
The Supreme Court's 1945 decision in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington created the need for a transfer of venue statute as the Court
moved away from Pennoyer's traditional notion of personal jurisdiction to
the now familiar "minimum contacts" analysis. 38 With the ability to secure
personal jurisdiction over a defendant in any forum with which the defendant
had minimum contacts came the risk that plaintiffs would initiate litigation in
distant forums with "few connections with the parties or the underlying
34 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
35 See 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 20, § 3841.
36 See id.; see also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 512 (1947) (In a
negligence action initiated in a federal court in New York by a Virginia citizen against a
Pennsylvania corporation doing business in both New York and Virginia, the New York
court did not abuse its discretion for dismissing the action under forum non conveniens
where the jurisdiction of the New York court was based only on diversity of citizenship
and the case had no meaningful contacts with New York.).
37 See David E. Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer and the Interests of Justice, 66
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 443, 448 (1990); see also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722-23
(1877). The most prominent exception to the rule of personal jurisdiction in Pennoyer
allowed personal jurisdiction over non-residents physically present in the forum state at
the time they were served with process. See Steinberg, supra, at 448 n. 18; cf Burnham v.
Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 634 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("For much of the
19th century, American courts did not uniformly recognize the concept of transient
jurisdiction ... ").
38 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) ("[D]ue process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he not be
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."') (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
2011)
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dispute" in an effort to obtain a quick settlement or to take advantage of a
"unique legal doctrine." 39
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. Kepner, "which was prosecuted under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) in New York, although the
accident occurred and the employee resided in Ohio,"40 typifies the
harassment made possible by the expansion of personal jurisdiction.41
Kepner antedates International Shoe,42 but the plaintiff had the ability to
bring suit in a distant venue, as he would under International Shoe's
minimum contacts test, under the special venue provision of FELA.43 The
plaintiff thus filed suit against the railroad in New York because the railroad
was "doing business in the New York district where the damage suit was
filed .... ,,44
The railroad sought to enjoin the prosecution of the New York case in an
Ohio state court.45 The Ohio court refused to enjoin the plaintiff, and both the
Supreme Court of Ohio and the United States Supreme Court subsequently
affirmed their decision.46 In support of its holding, the Supreme Court wrote:
The real contention of petitioner [railroad] is that despite the admitted
venue, respondent is acting in a vexatious and inequitable manner in
maintaining the federal court suit in a distant jurisdiction when a convenient
and suitable forum is at respondent's doorstep .... But the federal courts
have felt they could not interfere with suits in far federal districts where the
inequity alleged was based only on inconvenience. 47
Thus, under FELA, and later, International Shoe, a plaintiff, acting in a
"vexatious" manner could file suit in a distant forum in order to harass the
39 See Steinberg, supra note 37, at 449.
40 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006) (Historical and Revision Notes).
41 See Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 (1941) (cited in § 1404
Reviser's Note as illustrating the need for a transfer provision); see also Steinberg, supra
note 37, at 449. A number of prominent commentators have viewed Kepner as an
example of the harassment available due to expanded personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., J.
MOORE, MOORE'S JUDICIAL CODE COMMENTARY 205-06 (1949); Robert Braucher, The
Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARV. L. REv. 908, 933-35 (1947).
42 Kepner is a 1941 case, and International Shoe did not expand personal
jurisdiction until 1945. Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
43 See 45 U.S.C. § 56 (2006); see also Kepner, 314 U.S. at 49 (noting that under the
FELA venue statute an action may be brought in a federal court in the district where the
defendant resided, in which the cause of action arose, or in any district where the
defendant is doing business when the action is commenced).
44 Kepner, 314 U.S. at 48.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 48-49, 54.
47 1d. at51, 53.
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defendant, and the defendant had little chance of being released from the
inconvenient forum.48
In response to Kepner, the development of the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, "which authorized dismissal of a suit where another court would
provide a more convenient forum," quickly developed.49 However, the
doctrine of forum non conveniens had the potential to work great prejudice
against a plaintiff if, while the plaintiff was litigating her forum non
conveniens motion, the relevant statute of limitations expired thereby
stranding the plaintiff with no court to hear her case.50 As a result of this
hazard, "[florum non conveniens dismissals [] were . . . not favored, and
courts often declined to grant such motions. '51 Thus, the need for a transfer
of venue statute had matured, and the enactment of § 1404(a) met the need.
Very little legislative history accompanied § 1404(a); the meager
Reviser's Note-which is not particularly helpfil-is the main source.52
According to the Note, § 1404(a) was "drafted in accordance with the
doctrine of forum non conveniens ... [and], [t]he new subsection requires the
court to determine that the transfer is necessary for convenience of the parties
and witnesses, and further, that it is in the interest of justice to do so."'53 The
absence of a definitive Congressional expression regarding the purpose of
48 Id.; see also Steinberg, supra note 37, at 449-51.
49 Steinberg, supra note 37, at 449; see Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Co., 330 U.S.
518 (1947).
50 See All States Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (1952) ("The forum non
conveniens doctrine is quite different from Section 1404(a). That doctrine involves the
dismissal of a case because the forum chosen by the plaintiff is so completely
inappropriate and inconvenient that it is better to stop the litigation in the place where
brought and let it start all over again somewhere else. It is quite naturally subject to
careful limitation for it not only denies the plaintiff the generally accorded privilege of
bringing an action where he chooses, but makes it possible for him to lose out
completely, through the running of the statute of limitations in the forum finally deemed
appropriate."); see also Steinberg, supra note 37, at 450.
51 Id. at 450-51 (footnotes omitted).
52 See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Historical and Revision Notes); see also Ferens v. John
Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990) (noting the "scant" legislative history of § 1404(a));
Steinberg, supra note 37, at 452 (commenting that, other than the Reviser's Note, "[v]ery
little additional legislative history discusses the transfer statute").
53 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (Historical and Revision Notes).
Although the new code was not enacted until several months after the Supreme
Court's adoption of the forum non conveniens doctrine in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
the transfer provision had been proposed several years before. In a creative bit of
retroactive legislative history, annotations to section 1404 refer to it as a codification
of the forum non conveniens doctrine.
Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine,
133 U. PA. L. REv. 781, 807 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
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§ 1404(a) has led the courts to weigh in on the matter; one district court in
Oklahoma has expressed the commonly accepted view that "[t]he purpose of
§ 1404(a) is to prevent the waste of time, energy and money and to protect
litigants, witnesses and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and
expense." 54
Under § 1404(a), the district court must balance a number of factors, and
in its discretion determine whether the movant has demonstrated that the
conveniences of the parties and witnesses and the interests of justice will be
served by transferring the action to another venue.55 This decision is
inherently discretionary, and the facts of each case will determine the
outcome of the motion.56 As one court has noted, "[w]isely it has not been
attempted to catalogue the circumstances which will justify or require grant
or denial of transfer. Given the statutory standards the decision is left to the
sound discretion of the court."'57
Statements from the federal courts are not uniform regarding which
factors should be balanced in the transfer analysis: some courts limit
themselves to the factors that would be considered on a motion to dismiss for
forum non conveniens, others consider a "wide variety of other factors;"
some courts divide the factors into Gulf Oil's public and private categories,58
and some do not.59 However, the diverse factors considered by district courts
54 Pope v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 446 F. Supp. 447, 449 (W.D. Okla. 1978); see also
Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 516-17 (1990); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S.
612, 616 (1964).
55 See 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 20, § 3847 ("[M]uch necessarily
must turn on the particular facts of each case and ... the trial court must consider and
balance all the relevant factors to determine whether or not the litigation would proceed
more conveniently and the interests of justice be better served by transfer to a different
forum ...").
56 Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 622 (The purpose of the statute is the "individualized,
case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness ....") (internal quotation marks
omitted); SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("[T]he proper
technique to be employed is a factually analytical, case-by-case determination of
convenience and fairness.").
57 Brown v. Woodring, 174 F. Supp. 640, 644 (M.D. Pa. 1959).
58 See Pro Edge, L.P. v. Gue, 374 F. Supp. 2d 711, 755 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (equating
§ 1404(a) transfer with "transfer on forum non conveniens grounds," and harvesting the
transfer factors from the Supreme Court's Guf Oil and Piper Aircraft forum non
conveniens decisions).
59 See Decker Coal Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 805 F.2d 834, 843 (9th Cir.
1986) ("This statute partially displaces the common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens. Nonetheless, forum non conveniens considerations are helpful in deciding a
§ 1404 transfer motion." (internal citation omitted)). For an extensive circuit-by-circuit
list of the factors considered by district courts on a § 1404(a) motion see 15 WRIGHT,
MILLER & COOPER, supra note 20, § 3847 n. 13.
[Vol. 72:1
SUPER VISING DISCRETION
on transfer motions do not defeat the courts' "commonality of analysis." 60
The analysis of the court always turns on whether or not the conveniences of
the parties and witnesses and the interests of justice will be furthered by
transfer. 61
The Supreme Court has done little to clarify this area of the law, and one
commentator notes, "Supreme Court review of transfer motions has occurred
rarely and has proven unilluminating." 62 In fact, the Supreme Court decision
most influential on § 1404(a) came not from a case directly considering the
statute, but from a forum non conveniens case: GulfOil Corp. v. Gilbert.63 In
Gulf Oil, one of the questions decided by the Court was "whether the United
States District Court has inherent power to dismiss a suit pursuant to the
doctrine of forum non conveniens ... ."64 The Court held that the district
court did have the power to dismiss a suit on forum non conveniens grounds,
and commented that "[t]he doctrine leaves much to the discretion of the court
to which plaintiff resorts .... 65 In the course of its opinion the Court set out
a number of considerations, both private and public in nature, that the district
court should balance in the exercise of its discretion.66
Many of the Court's decisions expressly considering § 1404(a) have
simply, in line with the policy of Gulf Oil, deferred to the discretion of the
trial court. 67 Norwood v. Kirkpatrick illustrates this policy of deference, and,
indeed, holds that district courts have more discretion to transfer cases under
§ 1404(a) than they have to dismiss them under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens. 68 In Norwood, three railcar employees brought suit in the
60 See 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 20, § 3847.
61 Id. (observing that the multiplicity of factors considered by the federal courts on
transfer motions is a result of the necessarily fact-intensive inquiry required to determine
whether the litigation will proceed more conveniently for the parties and the witnesses
and whether the litigation will be more just in another venue).
62 Steinberg, supra note 37, at 453.
63 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); see Steinberg, supra note 37, at
453 (acknowledging that Gulf Oil has been the most important Supreme Court decision
for § 1404(a)).
64 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 502.
65 Id. at 508, 512.
66 Id. at 508-09. (The private interests included: "relative ease of access to sources
of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of
obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would
be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case
easy, expeditious and inexpensive." The public interests mentioned by the court were:
administrative concerns, the localized interest in the litigation, and docket crowding.)
67 Steinberg, supra note 37, at 454.
68 Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955) ("As a consequence, we believe
that Congress, by the term 'for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
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Eastern District of Pennsylvania under the Federal Employers' Liability Act
for injuries they received when a train derailed in South Carolina.69 The
defendant railroad filed a motion to transfer to the Eastern District of South
Carolina, and that motion was granted. 70 In his transfer order the district
judge stated that, if not for the Third Circuit's recent ruling in All States
Freight v. Modarelli holding that broader discretion exists in the § 1404(a)
context than in the forum non conveniens context, he would deny the motion
to transfer.7 1 The Third Circuit denied the plaintiffs petition for mandamus,
and the Supreme Court affirmed by adopting the Third Circuit's construction
of § 1404(a) granting broader discretion to the trial judge on transfer
decisions. 72 Thus, under Norwood, the Court's usual course of action when
reviewing a transfer order under § 1404(a) will be to defer to the discretion
of the trial judge.
In Hoffman v. Blaski, the Court has placed some limits, however, on the
discretion of district courts in ruling on transfer motions by constraining
transfers to districts where the suit could have been brought at the outset of
the litigation regardless of whether jurisdiction and venue were proper at the
time of the transfer. 73 This limitation has not been well received; Professor
Steinberg explains the source of Hoffman's woes:
[T]he decision in Hoffman focuses on the wrong party. Hoffnan
protects the defendant against a transfer to an inconvenient forum. But the
defendant does not need this protection where the defendant himself is
seeking the transfer .... [I]f the defendant wishes to litigate in a forum
where he lacks any contacts, and that forum is somehow more convenient
than the court chosen by the plaintiff, it is hard to imagine how a transfer
will prejudice the defendant.
Instead, the party who may suffer prejudice from a section 1404
transfer is the plaintiff-the party opposing the defendant's motion .... But
the Hoffnan rule provides no protection to a plaintiff opposing a
justice,' intended to permit courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of
inconvenience. This is not to say that the relevant factors have changed or that the
plaintiffs choice of forum is not to be considered, but only that the discretion to be
exercised is broader.").
6 9 Id. at 29-30.
70 Id. at 30.
71 Id.; see also All States Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011 (3d Cir. 1952).
7 2 Norwood, 349 U.S. at 32 ("[W]e believe that Congress ... intended to permit
courts to grant transfers upon a lesser showing of inconvenience. This is not to say that
the relevant factors have changed ... but only that the discretion to be exercised is
broader.").
73 Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960).
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defendant's motion to transfer. A plaintiff's lack of contacts with a state in
no way prevents a transfer to a court in that state.
74
The Hoffman rule, though a limitation of a district court's transfer discretion,
has been the brunt of much scholarly criticism due to its failure to provide
any protection to the plaintiff.75
Section 1404(a), therefore, provides a protective mechanism whereby
parties-usually defendants-may avoid undue inconvenience by seeking the
transfer of their case to a more convenient forum. The district court is
afforded substantial deference in the exercise of its discretion when ruling on
transfer motions under § 1404(a), and whether the motion will be granted in
any given case turns on case-specific facts.
B. The All Writs Act, 28 US.C. § 1651
Like § 1404(a), brevity defines the All Writs Act-the statute
authorizing the writ of mandamus. The Act provides:
The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law. An alternative writ or rule nisi
may be issued by a justice or judge of a court which has jurisdiction. 76
The Supreme Court has interpreted the All Writs Act in such a way as to
create two distinct uses of the writ: supervisory and advisory.77 The
supervisory use of the writ refers to those circumstances where a court of
appeals issues a writ to constrain a district court to its jurisdiction, that is, to
correct an "usurpation of judicial power," and to those situations when the
writ issues to correct "a clear abuse of discretion." 7 8 Supervisory mandamus
is most often invoked to correct established and repeated bad habits of the
74 Steinberg, supra note 37, at 461-62.
75 See e.g., Herbert J. Korbel, The Law of Federal Venue and Choice of the Most
Convenient Forum, 15 RUTGERs L. REv. 607, 613 (1961) (the Supreme Court relied on
"rather bizarre reasoning" in Hoffman); Steinberg, supra note 37, at 457 ("[T]he Hoffnan
rule is an inappropriate limitation on the motion to transfer."); 15 WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 20, § 3845 ("The commentators have been highly critical of Hoffman
v. Blaski ... ").
76 All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 165 1(a)-(b) (2006). For the purposes of this Note, the
focus will be on the first sentence of the statute.
77 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 20, § 3934.
78 See Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953) (quoting
DeBeers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 217 (1945)); 16 WRIGHT, MILLER
& COOPER, supra note 20, § 3934 (quoting La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249,
257 (1957)).
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district courts.79 The advisory use of mandamus, on the other hand, refers to
the use of the writ to review novel and important questions not previously
presented to any court that would escape review on final judgment.80 The
discussion relating to mandamus in the remainder of this Note regards only
supervisory mandamus. Therefore, an extended consideration of advisory
mandamus is beyond the scope of this Note, and any further mention of
mandamus should be understood as referring to the supervisory use of the
writ.81
La Buy v. Howes Leather Co. is the most important case within the realm
of supervisory mandamus. 82 La Buy involved mandamus proceedings to
compel a United States district judge to vacate his orders under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 53(b) referring the trial of antitrust cases to a special master.83 The
Seventh Circuit issued a writ of mandamus compelling the district judge to
vacate his referrals because it found that the orders were beyond the scope of
the district court's power under Rule 53(b).84
On review, the Supreme Court addressed the circuit court's "naked
power" to issue the writ, and noted that "the common-law writs, like
equitable remedies, may be granted or withheld in the sound discretion of the
court," and that the re-codification of the All Writs Act in 1948 had done
nothing to diminish that power.85 Regarding whether the writ of mandamus
could be used in the method employed by the Seventh Circuit, to correct an
often repeated error, the Court held that the "supervisory control of the
District Courts by the Courts of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial
administration in the federal system. The All Writs Act confers on the Courts
of Appeals the discretionary power to issue writs of mandamus in the
exceptional circumstances existing here." 86 The Courts of Appeals may,
therefore, exercise their supervisory mandamus power and issue a writ of
79 See 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 20, § 3934.1.
80 See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 111 (1964); 16 WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra note 20, § 3934.1.
81 For additional discussion regarding the distinction between the supervisory and
advisory uses of the writ of mandamus see 16 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note
20, § 3934.1 n.5 (listing cases).
82 La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
83 Id. at 250.
84 Id. at 256.
85 Id. at 255 (quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943)).
86 Id. at 259-60.
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mandamus in order to correct a trial court when it clearly abuses its
discretion or takes action it has no power to take.87
The Supreme Court recently clarified the standard to be applied when
determining whether a writ of mandamus will issue. In Cheney v. United
States District Court for D.C., the Court set out a three-pronged test for the
issuance of the writ:
As the writ is one of the most potent weapons in the judicial arsenal,
three conditions must be satisfied before it may issue. First, the party
seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no other adequate means to attain
the relief he desires,-a condition designed to ensure that the writ will not
be used as a substitute for the regular appeals process. Second, the
petitioner must satisfy the burden of showing that [his] right to issuance of
the writ is clear and indisputable. Third, even if the first two prerequisites
have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be
satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances. 88
The All Writs Act, then, provides courts of appeals with the power to
issue writs of mandamus in supervision of the district courts. This is a power,
however, that must be wielded with care, and the Supreme Court has
articulated a three-prong test to determine when the writ should issue.
Despite the Court's clear articulation regarding the availability of mandamus
and the standard which is to govern the issuance of the writ of mandamus,
the confluence of mandamus doctrine and § 1404(a) has produced nothing
short of chaos in the appellate courts.
C. Supervising Discretion: Mandamus Review of§ 1404(a) Transfer
Orders
When a litigant desires review of a district court's disposition on a
transfer motion, the doctrines of mandamus and transfer collide. An order
granting or denying transfer under § 1404(a) is interlocutory in nature and,
therefore, not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.89
87 See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Will v.
United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1967) and Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland,
346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953)).
88 Id. at 380-81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89 See In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 300 F.3d 368, 378 (3d Cir. 2002);
D'Ippolito v. Am. Oil Co., 401 F.2d 764, 765 (2d Cir. 1968) ("There is simply no basis
for thinking that, despite twenty years of judicial construction that orders under § 1404(a)
can be reviewed only by mandamus ... [O]ne type of order under § 1404(a) has been
appealable all along."); 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 20, § 3855 ("It is
entirely settled ... that an order granting or denying a motion to transfer venue under
Section 1404(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code is interlocutory in character and not
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Additionally, the availability of interlocutory review of transfer orders under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) is disputed.90 Mandamus, therefore, is the only
consistently available, immediate, and effective option for review of transfer
orders.91
Mandamus review of transfer orders takes two different forms: review
for usurpation of judicial power-sometimes called review for "error of
law"-and review for abuse of discretion.92 Using mandamus to review
district court transfer orders for usurpation of judicial power or error of law is
uncontroversial and available in every circuit.93 Whether a court of appeals
immediately appealable under Section 1291 of the same Title."). It should also be noted
that § 1404(a) orders are generally not appealable under the collateral order doctrine. See
Nascone v. Spudnuts, 735 F.2d 763, 772 (3d Cir. 1984) ("[O]rders granting or denying
motions to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ... are not immediately appealable under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 as collaterally final orders.").
90 Compare Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 433 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1970) (no review
of transfer orders under § 1404(a) by way of § 1292(b)), and A. Olinick & Sons v.
Dempster Bros., 365 F.2d 439, 443 (2d Cir. 1966) (noting that "§ 1292(b) is not available
as a means to review the grant or denial of § 1404(a) motions for incorrect evaluation of
proper factors" because "the correctness of such an evaluation" cannot be "described as a
controlling question of law." (internal citations omitted)), and Standard v. Stoll Packing
Corp., 315 F.2d 626, 626 (3d Cir. 1963) (refusing to allow appeal of denial of transfer
under § 1292(b)), and Bufalino v. Kennedy, 273 F.2d 71, 71 (6th Cir. 1959) (denying
interlocutory review of a § 1404(a) order because such orders are not immediately
appealable under § 1291 or § 1292(b) in the Sixth Circuit), with Houston Fearless Corp.
v. Teter, 318 F.2d 822, 827-28 (10th Cir. 1963) (on a § 1292(b) appeal the court held that
the district court had not erred by denying petitioner's § 1404(a) transfer motion).
91 See In re Nat'l Presto Indus., 347 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that
no adequate remedy exists for an improper ruling on a transfer motion by way of an
appeal from final judgment because the appellant would not be able to overcome
harmless error).
92 See 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 20, § 3855. Compare Commercial
Lighting Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 537 F.2d 1078, 1079 (9th Cir. 1976) (writ issued
because the transferee forum was not one where the suit could have been brought
originally), with In re Horseshoe Entm't, 337 F.3d 429, 435 (5th Cir. 2003) (writ issued
because district court was found to have abused its discretion in denying transfer).
93 See 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 20, § 3855 ("Almost all courts
agree that the writs can be used if the trial court made an error of law ...."); see, e.g., In
re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 206 (5th Cir. 2004) (court erred as a matter of law
because it considered an inappropriate factor, the location of counsel, in its § 1404(a)
analysis); In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 953 (11th Cir. 2003) (mandamus is
available to remedy clear usurpation of power); In re Federal-Mogul Global, Inc., 300
F.3d 368, 379 (3d Cir. 2002) (mandamus is an appropriate remedy when the district court
took action it had no power to take); Hicks v. Duckworth, 856 F.2d 934, 935 (7th Cir.
1988) (court usurped judicial power when it transferred habeas corpus action to a district
where it could not have been brought); In re Perry, 859 F.2d 1043, 1046 (1st Cir. 1988)
(noting that mandamus may be appropriate when the lower court acts beyond its authority
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may employ mandamus to review transfer orders for abuse of discretion, and
if so, to what extent, is, however, the subject of great dispute.94
Federal appellate courts regularly issue the writ of mandamus to correct a
trial court's disposition on a § 1404(a) transfer motion when the trial court
has taken an action that it had no power to take-such as transferring the
action to a district where it could not have been brought in the first
instance-and in order to remedy other errors of law. 95 The following
examples illustrate the types of errors of law remedied by mandamus:
transferring an action to a district where it could not have been brought at the
such that it usurps judicial power); In re Dalton, 733 F.2d 710, 715 (10th Cir. 1984)
(mandamus appropriate when the lower court acted without jurisdiction or usurped
power); In re Scott, 709 F.2d 717, 719 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (issuing mandamus when the
court erred as a matter of law by considering an improper transfer factor); Toro Co. v.
Alsop, 565 F.2d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 1977) (mandamus available when the trial judge
transfers case where it could not have been brought originally thereby usurping judical
power); Skil Corp. v. Millers Falls Co., 541 F.2d 554, 557 (6th Cir. 1976) (mandamus is
the proper remedy when transfer has been ordered in violation of legal limits of 1404(a));
A.J. Indus. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for C.D. Cal., 503 F.2d 384, 386 (9th Cir. 1974) (court
permitted mandamus review where district court judge allegedly considered improper
factors in the transfer analysis); Am. Flyers Airline Corp. v. Farrell, 385 F.2d 936, 937
(2d Cir. 1967) (commenting that mandamus is not available to correct mere error in the
exercise of judicial power, but is available to correct a usurpation of judicial power);
Clayton v. Warlick, 232 F.2d 699, 705-06 (4th Cir. 1956) (mandamus available only to
remedy usurpation ofjudicial power or the district judge's legal error).
94 See Hustler Magazine v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 790 F.2d 69, 70 (10th Cir. 1986)
("Cognizant that a thorny thicket abounds in this area, we are reluctant to compound the
tangle." (footnotes omitted)); Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor
Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 987 (1 1th Cir. 1982) ("There is substantial disagreement among
the circuits, and some apparent confusion within the respective circuits, concerning the
appropriate role of mandamus as a remedy for abuses of discretion by district courts in
deciding motions under § 1404(a)." (citations omitted)); Wilkins v. Erickson, 484 F.2d
969, 971 (8th Cir. 1973) ("The extent to which the writ of mandamus can be used to
review an order granting or refusing transfer under § 1404(a) varies widely among
federal appellate courts."); Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of Am., 408 F.2d 16, 18 (9th
Cir. 1969) ("Lacking an authoritative pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the
correctness of the issuance of the writ to evaluate a trial court's discretion, the circuits are
drastically divided on the question." (footnotes omitted)). The confusion of the federal
courts in this area is so great that it has been recognized in the state courts. See Leung v.
Nunes, 729 A.2d 956, 963-64 (Md. 1999) ("The federal courts of appeals for decades
have struggled with the question of whether they should entertain petitions for mandamus
to review orders granting or denying transfers, particularly where the error is alleged to
be an abuse of discretion in applying correct legal principles."); State ex rel. Allied
Chem. Co. v. Aurelius, 474 N.E.2d 618, 619 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) ("Some federal courts
have [] employed the extraordinary writs to review interlocutory orders involving venue.
In Ohio, on the contrary, it is the strong policy of the law to deny extraordinary writs in
such cases.").
95 See 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 20, § 3855.
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outset of the litigation,96 misinterpreting the statutorily prescribed transfer
factors, 97 failing to provide an opportunity to be heard on the transfer
motion,98 omitting consideration of the statutory criteria,99 and refusing to
exercise discretion on a transfer motion when such exercise is required. 100
Mandamus review to remedy legal error is common and
uncontroversial.' 0 ' Conversely, little or no agreement exists regarding
mandamus review of transfer orders for abuse of discretion; several appellate
courts have noted that the decisions regarding the availability and extent of
review in this context are "in hopeless conflict." 10 2 Some circuits allow
mandamus review of § 1404(a) orders for abuse of discretion; 0 3 others have
essentially created a system whereby these orders are unreviewable if the
order of the district judge demonstrates that she considered the statutorily
prescribed factors.104 Still, other circuits have "served notice" that they will
not review transfer orders for abuse of discretion "except in really
extraordinary situations," which, pragmatically speaking, has meant that the
96 See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960) (transfer must be to a district
where the suit could have been brought at the commencement of the suit independent of
the wishes of the defendant).
97 See Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d at 204 (district court misconstrued the meaning of
"parties and witnesses" when it interpreted the phrase to be limited to those parties and
witnesses mentioned in the original complaint).
98 See Hustler Magazine, Inc., 790 F.2d at 71 ("We grant the petition here because
the trial judge did not give the petitioners a fair opportunity to establish that the interests
of justice and the convenience of the parties and the witnesses mandated a change of
venue."); see also Swindell-Dressler Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267, 273-74 (3d Cir.
1962) (district court denied movant under § 1404(a) procedural due process by denying a
hearing or opportunity to be heard on the transfer issue).
99 See In re Scott, 709 F.2d 717, 721 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (mandamus may issue to
remedy the sua sponte transfer of a case not justified by any of the statutory
considerations); Wiren v. Laws, 194 F.2d 873, 874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (issuing
mandamus where the district judge did not justify his decision according to the statutory
criteria of § 1404(a)).
100 See Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Igoe, 212 F.2d 378, 382 (7th Cir.
1954).
101 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
102 See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Hyde, 238 F.2d 852, 856 (8th Cir. 1956); Clayton v.
Warlick, 232 F.2d 699, 703 (4th Cir. 1956); see also 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER,
supra note 20, § 3855.
103 See, e.g., In re Warrick, 70 F.3d 736, 739 (2d Cir. 1995) (reviewing transfer
order for abuse of discretion).
104 See, e.g., Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of Am., 408 F.2d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1969)
("We decline to issue the writ when it appears from a well-reasoned holding by the trial




Circuit refuses to review such orders at all. 105 Within the circuits that allow
mandamus review for abuse of discretion, some allow for expansive
review-the appellate court reconsiders the district court's reasoning on each
of the transfer factors-while other circuits provide for a more limited form
of review. 106 Compounding the already substantial confusion in this area,
regardless of the extent of review conducted, the circuits differ in their
formulations of the standard that must be met in order for the writ to issue. 10 7
A leading commentator notes, by way of introduction to the topic, that
105 See In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 183 (1st Cir. 1954) (disapproved of on other
grounds by In re Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 381-82 (1st Cir. 1961)). Though the
Josephson court noted that, when the question is whether the trial judge abused her
discretion in ruling on a transfer motion, it would deny leave to file a petition for
mandamus "except in really extraordinary situations," the First Circuit has never found
such a situation, and this pronouncement, as evidenced by the lack of opinions in the
circuit dealing with the issue, has been a practical prohibition on mandamus review of
transfer orders for abuse of discretion in the First Circuit. See Matrix Grp. Ltd., v.
Rawlings Sporting Goods Co., 378 F.3d 29, 32 n.2 (1 st Cir. 2004) (citing In re Josephson
as the current position of the First Circuit); 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note
20, at § 3855.
106 Compare Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d 304, 312 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting In
re Horseshoe Entm't, 337 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2003) (allowing expansive review of
the trial court's decision)), with In re Ralston Purina Co., 726 F.2d 1002, 1005-06 (4th
Cir. 1984) (undertaking a limited review of the facts considered by the trial court even
after holding that "it is in cases of abuse of judicial power, not merely abuse of discretion,
that mandamus lies"), and In re Josephson, 218 F.2d at 183 ("[I]n the future, except in
really extraordinary situations ... we shall stop such mandamus proceedings at the very
threshold, by denying leave to file the petitions for a writ of mandamus.").
107 See, e.g., Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 309-10 ("mandamus will be granted upon a
determination that there has been a clear abuse of discretion" which produces a "patently
erroneous result."); In re Nat'l Presto Indus., 347 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2003)
("[M]andamus ... is granted only upon a demonstration that the district court so far
exceeded the proper bounds of judicial discretion as to be legitimately considered
usurpative in character or in violation of a clear and indisputable legal right, or at the very
least, patently erroneous and that the injury caused by the challenged order cannot be
repaired by any means other than mandamus .... " (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); In re Ralston Purina Co., 726 F.2d at 1005 (mandamus will issue only
where abuse of'judicial power has occurred); Kasey, 408 F.2d at 20 ("We decline to issue
the writ when it appears from a well-reasoned holding by the trial judge that he has
considered the issues listed in 1404(a) and has made his decision accordingly. It is not
our function to substitute our judgment for that of the judge most familiar with the
problem."); A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., 365 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1966)
(mandamus will issue only to remedy clear-cut abuse of discretion); McGraw-Edison Co.
v. Van Pelt, 350 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1965) (Mandamus will not issue "[u]nless it is
made clearly to appear that the facts and circumstances are without any basis for a
judgment of discretion ... . If the facts and circumstances are rationally capable of
providing reasons for what the district court has done, its judgment based on those
reasons will not be reviewed.").
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"variations among the courts of appeal, and the changes of view within a
particular appellate court, are so great that the law on this point must be
examined on a circuit-by-circuit basis."' 108
The confusion on all fronts of this issue reduces to three basic questions,
the answers to which provide a valuable starting point for determining what
the law should be with regard to mandamus review of transfer orders for
abuse of discretion. The relevant questions are the following: (1) When is
mandamus appropriate to review the district court's exercise of discretion on
a transfer motion? (2) Assuming that mandamus review of a trial court's
discretion is appropriate in some circumstances, what should the scope of the
review be? 109 (3) Assuming that mandamus review is appropriate in some
circumstances, within the prescribed scope of review, what standard must be
met in order for the writ to issue?110 Because the threshold issue is the
question of whether mandamus review of transfer orders for abuse of
discretion should be available at all, the remainder of this Note focuses on
answering that question and leaves the task of defining the appropriate scope
and standard of review to another.
III. AN INTEREST-BASED ANSWER TO THE QUESTION: "WHEN IS
MANDAMUS REVIEW OF A DISTRICT COURT'S EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
ON A TRANSFER MOTION APPROPRIATE'?"
The law regarding the availability of mandamus to review a trial court's
exercise of discretion on a motion to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) is in a state of discord.1 11 And, the Ninth Circuit correctly
observed that the dearth of guidance from the Supreme Court on this issue
has created drastic division within the circuit courts. 112 The variety of views
held by those courts has led to diverging decisions; some circuits have made
mandamus review of transfer orders readily available, while others have
effectively shut the doors of the courthouse.1 13 Still other circuits find
themselves somewhere between the extremes. 114
108 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 20, § 3855.
109 See cases cited supra note 106.
110 See cases cited supra note 107.
111 See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
112 See Kasey, 408 F.2d at 18.
113 Compare Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(recognizing the availability of mandamus in the Fifth Circuit "as a limited means" to
review the discretion of a trial court exercised on a transfer order), and In re Nat'l Presto
Indus., 347 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that the Seventh Circuit will review
transfer motions for abuse of discretion and patent error), and In re Tripati 836 F.2d
1406, 1407 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (mandamus review of transfer orders available to review for
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Though "there is no agreement on the use of the writs to review the trial
court's exercise of its discretion," 15 it may not be fair, or accurate, to
characterize the decisions of the courts as "a thorny thicket in hopeless
conflict" as some courts have done." l6 There are, in the decisions in which a
writ of mandamus has issued to remedy a trial court's abuse of discretion,
several repeatedly protected interests. The circuit courts' protection of these
interests brings to this unsettled area of the law predictability, coherence, and
organization. These factors are present in the decisions of every circuit in
which a writ has issued in response to an abuse of discretion, and they persist
through time and despite the various standards applied by the courts. 117
gross abuse of discretion), and In re Dalton, 733 F.2d 710, 717 (10th Cir. 1984) (the
Tenth Circuit will employ mandamus to review transfer orders for clear abuse of
discretion), and A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., 365 F.2d 439, 445 (2d Cir. 1966)
(mandamus review of transfer orders for "clearcut abuse of discretion" available in the
Second Circuit), and Lemon v. Druffel, 253 F.2d 680, 685 (6th Cir. 1958) (reviewing a
transfer order for clear abuse of discretion), with Kasey, 408 F.2d at 20 (stating that the
Ninth Circuit will not engage in mandamus review of transfer orders for abuse of
discretion where the judge has considered the transfer factors and decided accordingly),
and In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182-83 (1st Cir. 1954) (no mandamus review of
transfer orders in the First Circuit when all that is claimed is that the district judge abused
his discretion when making the order), and All States Freight, Inc. v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d
1010, 1012 (3d Cir. 1952) (denying mandamus review of transfer orders in the Third
Circuit for abuse of discretion when the trial judge has considered the transfer factors and
made a decision).
114 See In re Ralston Purina Co., 726 F.2d 1002, 1005 (4th Cir. 1984) (engaging in
independent weighing of the transfer factors after purporting to only review for
usurpation of judicial power in the Fourth Circuit); Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v.
La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 987 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that under
the correct circumstances the writ "might issue to correct an abuse of discretion" on a
transfer order); Toro Co. v. Alsop, 565 F.2d 998, 1000 (8th Cir. 1977) (Eighth Circuit
undertakes threshold examination for judicial arbitrariness and continues on to review of
the facts and circumstances if the threshold factor is met).
115 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 20, § 3855.
116 Id. § 3855 n.29.
117 The factors are present in the Fifth Circuit's decisions. See, e.g., In re Horseshoe
Entm't, 337 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 2003). That Court reviews transfer orders for "clear
abuse of discretion leading to a patently erroneous result." Volkswagen 11, 545 F.3d at
310. The unifying factors are equally discernable in opinions of the Fourth Circuit, the
Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit. See In re Ricoh Corp., 870
F.2d 570, 573 (1 1th Cir. 1989) (applying a clear abuse of discretion standard); Pac. Car &
Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 951-52 (9th Cir. 1968) (applying a "clearly
erroneous" standard); Akers v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 378 F.2d 78, 80 (4th Cir. 1967)
(applying an abuse of discretion standard); Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Igoe,
220 F.2d 299, 304 (7th Cir. 1955) (applying abuse of discretion standard). The standards
applied by the courts in the preceding cases may or may not be the current standard
within the circuit. However, for the purposes of this Note, the currency of the standard
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Specifically, in each case in which the writ of mandamus has issued in
order to redress a trial court's abuse of discretion in ruling on a transfer
motion, one or more of the following circumstances is present: (1) the trial
court's decision has significantly impaired the ability of one or more parties
to conveniently access evidence; (2) the trial court's decision has
significantly inconvenienced the witnesses; (3) the trial court's decision has
located the litigation in a venue with no meaningful contacts to the case; (4)
the trial court's decision has negatively affected judicial economy; or (5) the
trial court's decision has ignored an otherwise valid and enforceable
contract.1 18 The interests commonly called upon by circuit courts to justify
the issuance of the writ of mandamus to remedy a trial court's abuse of
discretion on a transfer ruling, therefore, provide the answer to the question:
"When should mandamus review be available?" Mandamus review should be
triggered when the ruling of a district court on a transfer motion adversely
affects one or more of the interests historically protected by the circuit courts
on mandamus review or an interest of similar importance.
A. Interests Historically Protected by Mandamus
1. Access to Evidence
Circuit courts regularly appeal to the interest of the parties in convenient
access to evidence in order to justify the issuance of a writ.1 19 The appellate
courts have shown concern that the parties have the ability to conveniently
access not only different types of evidence, but also certain forms of
evidence.120 Thus, where a trial court's decision to grant or deny transfer of
applied is less important than the court's reasoning resulting in the issuance of the writ.
Thus, decisions under old rules will be analyzed in order to determine the interests
triggering the issuance of the writ.
118 Though the factors considered by courts when determining whether transfer
under § 1404(a) is appropriate vary slightly across the circuits, these five interests
represent a discrete subset of those factors. See 15 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra
note 20, § 3847 ("Federal courts differ in their statements as to what constitute the
relevant factors for transfer of venue. Some courts have said that a district judge's ruling
on a § 1404(a) transfer motion should consider the same factors as would a court ruling
on a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. However, most federal courts are
willing to consider a wider variety of factors, which seems appropriate given the
significant differences between the common law and statutory procedures.").
119 See, e.g., In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
("Because all of the physical evidence, including the headrests and the documentary
evidence, are far more conveniently located near the Ohio venue, the district court erred
in not weighing this factor in favor of transfer.").
120 See In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed Cir. 2009) (noting
that there were at least four non-party witnesses located within 100 miles of the Eastern
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venue results in the imposition of a "significant and unnecessary burden" on
the parties' ability to access sources of proof that would be avoided had the
judge come out differently on the transfer analysis, circuit courts may protect
the parties' interests on mandamus review. 121
In Akers, for example, the plaintiff filed a Federal Employers Liability
action against Norfolk & Western Railway in the district court located within
the Western District of Virginia at Roanoke, the city where the defendant's
headquarters were located. 122 The railroad employee, however, suffered his
injury in Cyrus, West Virginia, and the defendant subsequently moved to
transfer venue to the Southern District of West Virginia.123 The trial court
denied defendant's motion to transfer. 124
In issuing a writ of mandamus compelling the district judge to transfer
the action to the Southern District of West Virginia, the Fourth Circuit cited
convenient access to evidence as the primary reason for its holding. 125 None
of the witnesses to the accident were within Western District of Virginia's
subpoena power, a fact which would place the defendant in a situation in
which it was "left with no alternative but to adduce its evidence through
depositions, a mode of proof universally acknowledged to be inferior to the
personal appearance of witnesses in court." 126 Moreover, the location of the
accident was in the Southern District of West Virginia, where the plaintiff
resided and the medical records detailing plaintiffs post-accident treatments
were located. 127
District of North Carolina who were therefore subject to the Eastern District's
compulsory subpoena power for both deposition and trial testimony whereas there were
no non-party witnesses subject to the Eastern District of Texas's compulsory subpoena
power for both deposition and trial); Pac. Car & Foundry Co., 403 F.2d at 953
(recognizing that the district judge's failure to transfer an action from Hawaii to
Washington resulted in the hindering of defendant's ability to conveniently access
important documentary evidence); Igoe, 220 F.2d at 302 (noting that petitioner testified
by affidavit that "it would be impossible for it to properly present its defense by
depositions as it could not, in advance, anticipate evidence which may be offered by the
plaintiff'); accord Akers, 378 F.2d at 79 (not appropriate to put defendant in position of
having to present its entire case through deposition when it is possible to locate the trial
in a forum where live testimony may be compelled).
121 See In re Genentech, 566 F.3d 1338, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing the significant
and unnecessary burden that would adhere in the form of document transport if the case
were to remain in the Eastern District of Texas instead of being transferred to the
Northern District of California).
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The failure of the district court to transfer the case from the Western
District of Virginia to the Southern District of West Virginia on these facts
created a situation in which the only benefit to either party was the prospect
of shorter time to trial. 128 The downside, however, was that neither party had
the ability to put on their best case. The issuance of the writ cured this
undesirable situation by placing the litigation in a venue where the sources of
proof were easily accessible to both parties and where a trial would take
place in less than a year. 129
Also instructive is the most recent ruling in this line of mandamus cases,
In re Nintendo Co. 130 In Nintendo, Motiva filed a patent infringement suit
against Nintendo in the Eastern District of Texas alleging that the Wii
infringed Motiva's patent relating to a system that measures human
movements. 131 Nintendo moved to transfer venue under § 1404(a) to the
Western District of Washington-the company's American headquarters are
located in Redmond, Washington and Nintendo is organized under the laws
of Washington. 132 The Eastern District of Texas denied Nintendo's motion to
transfer.133
On Nintendo's petition for a writ of mandamus, the Federal Circuit noted
access to documentary evidence, an exceedingly important type of evidence
in a patent infringement action, as one of the motivating factors in its
decision to issue the writ. 134 Neither Nintendo nor Motiva housed documents
128 Akers, 378 F.2d at 79. Arguably, one additional benefit that would have accrued
to the plaintiff was that the litigation would take place in the forum of his choice. The
Court noted the right of the plaintiff to select his forum, that this selection was not to be
easily displaced, and that the initial decision regarding whether it would be rested in the
discretion of the district judge. Id. at 80. The Court, however, considered that if it was to
be "equally sensible to an abuse of [the district judge's] discretion when measured upon
the considerations of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)," this was an instance where the plaintiffs
choice had to give way. Id.
129 Id. at 79.
130 In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
131 Id. at 1196.
132 Id. at 1197.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1199. When an issue in a patent case is appealed to the Federal Circuit and
that issue does not involve substantive issues of patent law, the Federal Circuit applies
the law of the regional circuit in which the district court sits, and in the case of Nintendo,
the Fifth Circuit. See Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 836 (Fed.
Cir. 2003). In patent infringement actions, the majority of the evidence is in document
form. Thus, the physical location of the majority of the documents is of paramount
importance when a district court passes on a motion to transfer venue. In most cases,
transferring venue to the district where the defendant's documents are located will
facilitate the expeditious resolution of the litigation: "In patent infringement cases, the
bulk of the relevant evidence usually comes from the accused infringer. Consequently,
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in the Eastern District of Texas, and all of Nintendo's documents were
housed in either the Western District of Washington or in Kyoto, Japan. 135
Though Nintendo would be required to transport documents from Japan in
any event, access to sources of proof was more readily available to both
parties in the Western District of Washington than in the Eastern District of
Texas. 136 Thus, because "most evidence resides in Washington or Japan with
none in Texas," the Federal Circuit justified its issuance of the writ to compel
transfer to the Western District of Washington, in part, on access to evidence
grounds. 137
The trend illustrated by Akers and Nintendo-that circuit courts which
review transfer orders for abuse of discretion on mandamus review are more
apt to issue the writ when the decision of the district judge to grant or deny
transfer impairs the ability of one or more parties to conveniently access
sources of proof-exists in nearly every case where mandamus has issued to
remedy a transfer order abuse of discretion. 138 Ready access to evidence,
then, is an interest that the circuit courts seem willing to protect by exercise
of their mandamus power.
the place where the defendant's documents are kept weighs in favor of transfer to that
location." Neil Bros. v. World Wide Lines, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 325, 330 (E.D.N.Y.
2006).
135 In re Nintendo, 589 F.3d at 1199.
136 Id. The court addressed a common objection to consideration of convenient
access to documentary evidence in the transfer analysis: the impact of technology. Id.
Quoting Volkswagen II, the court stated that, "[t]he fact 'that access to some sources of
proof presents a lesser inconvenience now than it might have absent recent developments
does not render this factor superfluous."' Id. (quoting Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316).
131 In re Nintendo, 589 F.3d at 1199-1200 (emphasis added).
138 See, e.g., In re Genentech, 566 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re
Hoffmann-La Roche, 587 F.3d 1333, 1336-38 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re TS Tech USA
Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1320-21 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 316-17; In
re Horseshoe Entm't, 337 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Lord, 542 F.2d
719, 724 (8th Cir. 1976) (Lord is technically not a mandamus case, but a prohibition case.
However, when a writ of prohibition issues to prevent a judge from taking some action,
the circumstances are such that if the judge had taken the action prohibited, mandamus
would be appropriate; the court held in Lord that had the judge taken the prohibited
action and transferred the case, it would have amounted to a "clear abuse of discretion,"
the standard that must be met in order for mandamus to issue. Id. at 724. Thus,
prohibition cases are essentially preemptory mandamus cases.); Pac. Car & Foundry Co.
v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 1968); Chi. Rock Island and Pac. R.R. Co. v. Igoe,
220 F.2d 299, 301 (7th Cir. 1955).
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2. Inconvenience of Witnesses
Circuit courts undertaking mandamus review of transfer rulings have not
kindly viewed district court decisions imposing significant inconveniences
on witnesses. 139 The courts express concern over requiring witnesses to
travel great distances to attend trial when a more convenient venue is
available and the central relation of the action to the distant venue is that the
plaintiff selected it. 140 This concern stems from the general acceptance that
testifying in a distant venue disrupts the normal life of the non-party witness;
a concern expressly included in the language of the transfer statute.141 Thus,
the interests of witnesses in testifying in a convenient venue have been
protected by the appellate courts on mandamus review when the ruling of the
district judge results in excessive inconvenience.
Chicago Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Co. v. Igoe exemplifies the
interests of witnesses protected by the issuance of the writ. In Igoe, Charles
Mikesell was involved in a fatal car-train accident in Avoca, Iowa. 142 His
wife, Claudine, the administratrix of his estate, brought a wrongful death
action against the railroad in Illinois state court.143 The railroad removed the
action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
and subsequently filed a motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a) to the
Southern District of Iowa. 144 The district court denied the railroad's
§ 1404(a) motion, but the Seventh Circuit granted its petition for mandamus,
thus compelling the district court to effect the transfer to the Southern
District of Iowa. 145
Concern for the convenience of the witnesses figured prominently in the
Seventh Circuit's decision to grant mandamus relief.146 The accident took
139 See, e.g., Igoe, 220 F.2d at 303 ("[I]t is self-evident that the convenience of both
plaintiffs and defendant's witnesses would be served by a trial of the cause in the
Southern District of Iowa .... There is nothing in this record to indicate the convenience
of witnesses will be served by a trial in Chicago. There is no factual basis ... for the
respondent's conclusion to the contrary.").
140 Id. at 303-04.
141 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006) ("For the convenience of parties and witnesses"
(emphasis added)); see also In re Volkswagen AG, 371 F.3d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 2004)
("Additional distance means additional travel time; additional travel time increases the
probability for meal and lodging expenses; and additional travel time with overnight stays
increases the time which these fact witnesses must be away from their regular
employment.").
142 Igoe, 220 F.2d at 301.
143 Id.
144Id.
145 Id. at 301, 305.
146 Id. at 303.
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place in the Southern District of Iowa, all of the witnesses-for both the
plaintiff and defendant-were residents of Iowa. 147 Holding the trial in
Chicago would have burdened all of the witnesses with a trip of over 400
miles by train that would have consumed more than six hours each way.148
If, in the alternative, the Northern District of Illinois transferred the action to
an Iowa district court, as requested by the railroad, the maximum distance to
be traveled by any witness would be 104 miles.149 The Seventh Circuit noted
that it was "self-evident" that all of the non-party witnesses would be
convenienced by an Iowa trial, and issued the writ of mandamus in order to,
among other things, protect those witnesses. 150
In re Genentech is also relevant in regard to the protection of witnesses.
There, the Federal Circuit opined that "[t]he convenience of the witnesses is
probably the single most important factor in transfer analysis."'151 Thus, the
court dismissed the Eastern District of Texas's explanation that, although
Genentech had identified numerous witnesses in the proposed new venue,
and there were none in the Eastern District of Texas where the case presently
was, the convenience of the witnesses did not weigh in favor of transfer
because Genentech had failed to identify "key witnesses" in the proposed
new venue. 152 "It was not necessary for the district court to evaluate the
significance of the identified witnesses' testimony"; the convenience of all
witnesses is to be considered in the transfer analysis, and the witnesses'
interests in the important factor of convenience, therefore, may be protected
by mandamus review. 153
147 id. at 301, 303.
148 Igoe, 220 F.2d at 302-03.
149 Id. at 303.
150 Id.
151 In re Genentech, 566 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (quoting Neil Bros. v.
World Wide Lines, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 325, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 2006)).
152 Id. at 1343-44.
153 Id. at 1344; see also In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (noting as part of its justification for issuing the writ that the cost of attendance for
willing witnesses "clearly favors transfer"); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315,
1320 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("All of the identified key witnesses in this case are in Ohio,
Michigan, and Canada. Thus, the witnesses would need to travel approximately 900 more
miles to attend trial in Texas than in Ohio."); Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d 304, 317 (5th Cir.
2008) (en banc) (justifying the issuance of mandamus, in part, by demonstrating the
inconvenience imposed on witnesses by the district judge's denial of transfer); Pac. Car
& Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 953 (9th Cir. 1968) ("Many witnesses, including
several members of petitioner's corporate staff, would have to travel from the mainland
to Hawaii in order to give testimony with consequent disruption of the conduct of
petitioner's operation.").
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Igoe and Genentech show that § 1404(a)'s language addressing the
convenience of the witnesses is not ornamental. If a district court makes a
transfer decision resulting in the witnesses suffering additional
inconvenience due to the new location of the litigation, appellate courts will
approach that decision with skepticism, and may issue a writ of mandamus to
remedy the harm to the witnesses' convenience. 154
3. Localized Interest
When the location of litigation has little connection to the facts
underlying the dispute absent the fact that the plaintiff chose it, circuit courts
have granted the plaintiff's choice minimal weight on mandamus review, and
have cited this factor as one justification for the issuance of a writ directing
transfer to a venue with more meaningful contacts. 155 Appellate courts have
recognized that citizens of a community with no connection to the litigation
ought not be burdened with jury duty and that the people of the venue should
have more than a curious interest in the litigation. 156 The absence of some
meaningful connection between the venue and the litigation, therefore, seems
154 See also In re Horseshoe Entm't, 337 F.3d 429, 433 (5th Cir. 2003) (issuing the
writ, in part, because the witnesses were inconvenienced by the denial of transfer); Akers
v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 378 F.2d 78, 79 (4th Cir. 1967) (partially justifying the issuance of
the writ on grounds that the witnesses were inconvenienced by denial of transfer).
155 See, e.g., Pac. Car & Foundry, 403 F.2d at 954 ("'Congress was not willing to
give plaintiff free rein to haul defendant hither and yon at their caprice' .... Plaintiffs
choice of forum, then, is not the final word .... If the operative facts have not occurred
within the forum of original selection and that forum has no particular interest in the
parties or the subject matter, the plaintiff's choice is entitled only to minimal
consideration." (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Nat'l City Lines, 334 U.S.
573, 587 (1948))).
156 See In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 506 F.3d 376, 387 n.6 (5th Cir. 2007), affd
en banc, 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Koehring Co. v. Hyde Constr. Co., 324
F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1963)). The quote from Koehring originated in GulfOil Corp. v.
Gilbert, and more than is given in Koehring is relevant here:
Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community
which has no relation to the litigation. In cases which touch the affairs of many
persons, there is reason for holding the trial in their view and reach rather than in
remote parts of the country where they can learn of it by report only. There is a local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home.
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501,508-09 (1947); see also Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d
at 318 ("That the residents of the Marshall Division [of the Eastern District of Texas]
'would be interested to know' whether a defective product is available does not imply
that they have an interest-that is, a stake-in the resolution of this controversy.").
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to incline circuit courts to flex their "mandamus muscle" and send the
litigation to a more appropriate venue. 157
The Fifth Circuit's Volkswagen H decision demonstrates the willingness
of the appellate courts to consider the localized interest in the litigation when
reviewing a grant or denial of transfer under § 1404(a).158 The controversy in
Volkswagen II originated from a deadly automobile accident on the highways
of Dallas, Texas. 159 One of the accident victims was driving a Volkswagen
Golf and subsequently brought a products liability action against
Volkswagen alleging that design defects in the Golf caused the plaintiff
harm. 160 The plaintiff brought the products liability suit, however, not in
Dallas, which is in the Northern District of Texas, but in the Eastern District
of Texas at Marshall. 161 The plaintiffs selected the Eastern District of Texas
despite the following uncontroverted facts:
[T]he Volkswagen Golf was purchased in Dallas County, Texas; the
accident occurred on a freeway in Dallas, Texas; Dallas residents witnessed
the accident; Dallas police and paramedics responded and took action; a
Dallas doctor performed the autopsy; the third-party defendant lives in
Dallas County, Texas; none of the plaintiffs live in the Marshall Division;
no known party or non-party witness lives in the Marshall Division; no
known source of proof is located in the Marshall Division; and none of the
facts giving rise to this suit occurred in the Marshall Division. 162
The Eastern District of Texas simply had no contacts with the lawsuit.
The en banc Fifth Circuit, in explaining its decision to issue a writ of
mandamus compelling the transfer of the case from the Eastern District of
Texas to the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, emphasized the fact
that "there is no relevant factual connection to the Marshall Division. '163 The
Court's analysis of the localized interests factor balks at the prospect of
allowing litigation to remain in a venue with no connection to the facts
underlying the dispute, and makes clear that before the plaintiff's choice of
forum will be accorded significance, some evidence of meaningful contacts
157 The term "mandamus muscle" was coined by Judge Finnegan in his Igoe dissent:
"Our mandamus power is not a muscle which requires exercise to maintain its vitality."
Chi. Rock Island and Pac. R.R. Co. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299, 307 (7th Cir. 1955) (Finnegan,
J., dissenting).
158 See Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 318.
159 Id. at 307.
160 Id.
1611Id
162 Id. at 307-08.
163 Id. at 318.
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with the forum is required. 164 If no such evidence is put forth in response to a
transfer motion, and the motion is denied, mandamus may quickly follow.
In re Hoffman-La Roche is analogous. In a patent infringement suit
brought in the Eastern District of Texas, the Federal Circuit issued
mandamus to compel transfer to the Eastern District of North Carolina in part
because, "there appears to be no connection between this case and the
Eastern District of Texas except that in anticipation of this litigation,
Novartis' counsel in California... transferred [documents] to the offices of
its litigation counsel in Texas," but "the Eastern District of North Carolina's
local interest in this case remains strong because the cause of action calls into
question the work and reputation of several individuals residing in or near
that district and who presumably conduct business in that community."' 65
The basic principle apparent in Volkswagen H and Hoffinann-La Roche is
that though the plaintiff's choice of forum should not be easily disturbed,166
the forum selected by the plaintiff must have some meaningful connection to
the litigation. 167 If it does not, and the district judge fails, on a motion to
transfer and in the absence of other mitigating factors, to transfer the
litigation to a more appropriate venue, a writ is particularly appropriate to
prevent an undue burden from being imposed on the citizens of a forum
wholly foreign to the controversy. Where these circumstances are present,
the appellate court is more likely to issue the writ of mandamus to remedy
the trial court's abuse of discretion. 168
164 Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 318 ("In contrast [to the residents of the Marshall
Division], the residents of the Dallas Division have extensive connections with the events
that gave rise to this suit." Thus, "the only connection between this case and the Eastern
District of Texas is plaintiffs' choice to file there.").
165 In re Hoffmann-La Roche, 587 F.3d 1333, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
166 See Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970) ("It is black
letter law that a plaintiffs choice of proper forum is a paramount consideration in any
determination of a transfer request, and that choice should not be lightly disturbed.").
167 See Pac. Car & Foundry Co. v. Pence, 403 F.2d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 1968)
(plaintiff's choice of forum given "minimal consideration" if it has no connection to the
facts of the dispute or interest in the case).
168 See In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194, 1200 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ("The district
court gave the plaintiffs choice of forum far too much deference" and therefore "clearly
abused its discretion in denying transfer from a venue with no meaningful ties to the
case."); In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (no connection
to the Eastern District of Texas in a patent case other than the fact that some of the
allegedly infringing products had been sold in the district); Chi. Rock Island and Pac.
R.R. Co. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299, 304 (7th Cir. 1955) (quoting Josephson v. McGuire, 121
F. Supp. 83, 84 (D. Mass. 1954)) ("A large measure of deference is due to the plaintiff's
freedom to select his own forum. Yet this factor has minimal value where none of the





Judicial economy and the preservation and allocation of scarce judicial
resources are significant policy concerns of the federal courts. 169 Burgeoning
dockets force courts to use every tool at their disposal to ensure that their
time and energies are expended on the matters most deserving of them.170 In
the transfer context, the writ of mandamus has been such a tool; writs have
been issued to correct abuses of discretion by trial courts in order to avoid
gross waste of judicial resources. 171 When the writ issues to prevent waste of
resources, the circumstances are usually such that if mandamus did not issue
to either compel transfer or to vacate an already issued order, the result
would be multiple trials in different forums on the same, or substantially the
same, facts. 172
Docket congestion and the- speed of transferee courts are secondary
judicial economy concerns noted by the appellate courts. 173 The speed at
which litigation progresses in the transferee court, when employed as a
justification for issuing a writ of mandamus to compel or vacate a transfer
order, however, due to the speculative nature of the factor, is always coupled
with at least one other justification. 174 It, unlike, the judicial economy
169 See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Ace Elec. Serv., 648 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1377 n.2
(M.D. Fla. 2009) (recognizing the preservation of judicial resources as an important
policy interest); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Judicial resources, I am
well aware, are increasingly scarce these days.").
170 See Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for N.D. Cal., 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976) (recognizing
the reality of "excessively crowded lower court dockets"). Summary judgment, for
example, is one tool used by the district courts to alleviate docket pressure. See Craig M.
Reiser, Comment, The Unconstitutional Application of Summary Judgment in Factually
Intensive Inquiries, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 195, 220-21 (2009).
171 See, e.g., Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins, 373 F.2d 361, 362 (4th Cir. 1967).
172 Id.
173 See In re Hoffmann La-Roche, Inc., 587 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(justifying the issuance of the writ, in part, based on the Eastern District of North
Carolina's docket speed); United States v. Lord, 542 F.2d 719, 724 (8th Cir. 1976) ("If
[the case] were to be retransferred to the Southern District of New York, the most recent
statistics of the Administrative Office indicate that it would not likely be reached for trial
for at least twenty-five months. If it were retransferred to the District of Columbia ... it
would not likely be reached for trial for at least seventeen months.").
174 See In re Hoffinann-La Roche, 587 F.3d at 1336 (coupled with access to
evidence and localized interest concerns); Lord, 542 F.2d at 724-25 (coupled with access
to evidence concerns). The court in In re Genentech recognized the inherently speculative
nature of predicting how long it may take a cause of action to reach trial following
transfer:
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interest in avoiding the unnecessary expense of and lost time of multiple
trials on the same facts, cannot stand on its own as justification for the writ.
General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watkins illustrates the primary judicial
economy concern well. 175 General Tire was entrenched in patent litigation
with Firestone, Goodyear Tire, and other parties. 176 General had filed a
patent infringement action against Goodyear and the United States Rubber
Co. in the Northern District of Ohio alleging infringement of Patent No.
2,964,083.177 After the initial infringement suit had been filed, Firestone and
others filed an action in the District of Maryland for declaratory judgment of
non-infringement and invalidity of the same patent. 178 Despite assurances
from the parties and the court that the Maryland action would be reached and
disposed of before the Ohio actions were reached, the Maryland action had
still not reached settlement or disposition and the Ohio case was poised for
trial.179 The District of Maryland denied General Tire's motion to transfer
venue to the Northern District of Ohio, and on General Tire's petition to the
Fourth Circuit for mandamus the court commented that "[w]e are now faced
with the fact that ... both suits will be in the process of trial simultaneously
for at least nine months of the coming year involving the same patent and
consequently many common issues of fact and law."'180
The Fourth Circuit ruled that the Maryland District Court had abused its
discretion in not transferring the declaratory action to the Northern District of
Ohio. 181 In explaining its ruling the Fourth Circuit commented that the
district court "erred in its failure to weigh the impelling need for efficiency in
the administration of our court system against the right of Firestone to
continue the trial in a forum which no longer offered to it any convenience
...."182 "We are unanimously of the opinion that the case should be
transferred ... in order to prevent an extravagantly wasteful and useless
duplication of the time and effort of the federal courts by the simultaneous
We note that this factor appears to be the most speculative, and case-disposition
statistics may not always tell the whole story .... [W]e merely note that when ...
several relevant factors weigh in favor of transfer and others are neutral, then the
speed of the transferee district court should not alone outweigh all of those other
factors.
In re Genentech, 566 F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
175 Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 373 F.2d at 362.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 362-63.
179 Id. at 362.
180 Id.




trial of two complex and elaborate cases involving substantially the same
factual issues." 183 Thus, when a district court takes action on a transfer
motion that results in gross waste of judicial resources, appellate courts will
take a hard look in order to determine the propriety of mandamus.
5. The Presence of a Valid and Enforceable Contract
Finally, circuit courts regularly characterize a district court's failure to
give proper consideration in its transfer analysis to a valid and enforceable
contract between the parties-in the form of a forum selection clause-as an
abuse of discretion, and will issue a writ of mandamus to correct such an
abuse. 184 Under Stewart Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., "[t]he presence of
a forum-selection clause ... will be a significant factor that figures centrally
in the district court's calculus."' 185 Thus, when the party opposing a transfer
motion fails to demonstrate that "the contractual forum is sufficiently
inconvenient to justify retention of the dispute," and the trial court still fails
to effect transfer to the agreed upon forum, the trial court has abused its
discretion, and a writ of mandamus may issue to remedy this abuse.186
In re Ricoh Corp. is an appropriate example. 187 Stewart filed a breach of
contract suit against Ricoh in the Northern District of Alabama. 188 Despite
the existence of a forum selection clause indicating that disputes would be
litigated in the Southern District of New York, the Alabama District Court
denied Ricoh's § 1404(a) motion on the basis of its finding that the forum
selection clause was unenforceable under Alabama law.189 After extensive
interlocutory appeal on whether state or federal law governed the forum
selection clause's enforceability, and a Supreme Court decision holding that
183 Id. at 362.
184 See, e.g., Sunshine Beauty Supplies, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for C.D. Cal., 872 F.2d
310, 311 (9th Cir. 1989) (failing to consider a forum-selection clause prior to transfer is
an error remediable by mandamus); In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d 570, 572-73 (11 th Cir.
1989) (district court erred when it ignored the presence of a valid and enforceable forum
selection clause in its transfer analysis and such error is remediable by mandamus).
185 Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988). In concurrence, Justice
Kennedy noted that a forum selection clause should be, "in all but the most exceptional
cases," given controlling weight. Id. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also In re Ricoh
Corp., 870 F.2d at 573 ("[W]hile other factors might 'conceivably' militate against a
transfer, the clear import of the Court's opinion is that the venue mandated by a choice of
forum clause rarely will be outweighed by other 1404(a) factors.") (quoting Stewart Org.,
487 U.S. at 30).
186 In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d at 573.
187 Id.
118 Id. at 572.
189 Id.
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federal law governed, the Alabama District Court again denied Ricoh's
motion to transfer. 190
On Ricoh's mandamus petition, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district
court had committed clear abuse of discretion by not giving proper weight to
the forum selection clause: "After weighing various factors, the court decided
that neither the Manhattan nor the Alabama forum was demonstrably more
convenient than the other; the court therefore deferred to the plaintiff
Stewart's choice of an Alabama forum .... We conclude that the district
court clearly abused its discretion in so holding."'191 The issuance of a writ
was appropriate because deferring to the plaintiffs choice of forum in such
situations encourages parties to "violate their contractual obligations"'192
when "enforcement of valid forum selection clauses, bargained for by the
parties, protects their legitimate expectations and furthers vital interests of
the justice system."1 93 Thus, circuit courts will employ the writ of mandamus
to correct a trial court's abuse of discretion when it fails to give proper
consideration to the existence of a forum selection clause. 194
B. The Five Interests and Patent Litigation
Many of the cases in which mandamus has issued in review of a district
court's exercise of discretion on a transfer order have been patent cases as
this area of the law has proved to be most apt to produce facts warranting the
issuance of the writ. 195 From December 2008 to January 2010 the Federal
Circuit heard no less than seven patent cases involving mandamus review of
transfer orders for abuse of discretion. 196 It is not surprising, however, that
190 Id. For the Supreme Court opinion see Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22
(1988).
191 In re Ricoh Corp., 870 F.2d at 572-73.
192 Id. at 573.
193 Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
194 Another example of a writ issuing under these circumstances is Sunshine Beauty
Supplies, Inc. v. United States District Court for the Central District of California. 872
F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1989). Sunshine Beauty Supplies, however, may be considered an
error-of-law case because the district court did not only fail to give proper weight to the
forum selection clause, but it failed to consider it at all. Id. at 311. Thus, this case can be
taken either as an abuse of discretion case, for the same reasons as In re Ricoh, or as an
error-of-law case where the judge failed to consider one of the transfer factors. See supra
notes 191-93 and accompanying text.
195 See, e.g., In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re
Genentech, 566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Hoffmann-La Roche, 587 F.3d 1333
(Fed. Cir. 2009); In re Nintendo Co., 589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
196 See supra note 195; see also In re VTech Commc'ns, Inc., Misc. No. 909, 2010
WL 46332 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 6, 2010); In re Tellular Corp., 319 Fed. App'x 989 (Fed. Cir.
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the majority of writs redressing abuse of discretion on transfer orders issue in
the patent context. 197 This result is a function of the increased forum-
shopping that characterizes the world of patent litigation. 198
There are a number of reasons why forum-shopping exists in the patent
world on a level not present in other subsets of civil litigation. A few districts
have local rules designed to facilitate speedy patent litigation. 199 These rules
focus on disclosure, which under the rules takes place early and often, and on
claim construction.200 Districts with these special patent rules have
accordingly become known as patent "rocket dockets" for the speed at which
2009); In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 566 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Not surprisingly,
all seven cases were originally filed in the Eastern District of Texas. As is discussed
infra, this result is due to both the Fifth Circuit's liberal view on mandamus review of
transfer orders for abuse of discretion and the fact that the Eastern District of Texas is a
much sought after patent forum. Regarding forum shopping in the Eastern District of
Texas see Andrew DiNovo & Michael Smith, The New Spindletop-the Patent Litigation
Boom in the Eastern District of Texas (Intellectual Prop. Law Section, State Bar of Tex.),
Winter 2006, at 5, available at
http://www.texasbariplaw.org/newsletters/newsletter winter2006.pdf. The Eastern
District of Texas is particularly attractive to plaintiffs in patent cases because of the strict
local patent rules. See Alisha Kay Taylor, Note, What Does Forum Shopping in the
Eastern District of Texas Mean for Patent Reform?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 570, 572 (2007); see also General Order 05-8, Adopting Uniform Patent Rules (E.D.
Tex. 2005), available at
http ://www.txed.uscourts.gov/Rules/GeneralOrders/GeneralOrders.htm.
197 Other contexts in which the writ has recently issued are products liability and
employment discrimination. See Volkswagen I, 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(products liability); In re Horseshoe Entm't, 337 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2003) (employment
discrimination).
198 See BBC Int'l Ltd. v. Lumino Designs, Inc., 441 F. Supp. 2d 438, 443 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (recognizing that the federal courts have detected a "high degree" of forum
shopping in patent cases). See generally Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim
Construction: An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as
a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J. L. & TECH. 193 (2007) (discussing
the factors that incentivize forum shopping by patent plaintiffs).
199 See, e.g., Eastern District of Texas, General Order 05-08, Adopting Uniform
Patent Rules (E.D. Tex. 2005), available at
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/Rules/GeneralOrders/GeneralOrders.htm; Northern District
of California, Patent Local Rules, available at
http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/LocatRul.nsf/fec20e529a5572fU88256 9 b600 6 60 7eO/
5e313c0b7e4cd680882573e20062dbcf/$FILE/Pat4-10.pdf; Northern District of Georgia,
Patent Rules, available at http://www.gand.uscourts.gov/pdf/NDGARulesPatent.pdf;
Western District of Pennsylvania, Patent Rules, available at
http://www.pawd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Forms/LocalPatentRues.pdf
200 See Leychkis, supra note 198, at 209.
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the patent cases move to termination.20 Other factors incentivizing patent
plaintiff forum-shopping are plaintiff-friendly juries and judges experienced
in patent litigation. 20 2
Forum-shopping by patent plaintiffs has been recognized as a national
problem, and curbing the practice was one of the motivations behind the
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 which established the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:20 3
Patent litigation long has been identified as a problem area, characterized by
undue forum-shopping and unsettling inconsistency in adjudications. Based
on the evidence it compiled during the course of thorough hearings on the
subject, the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate
System-created by Act of Congress-concluded that patent law is an area
in which the application of the law to the facts of a case often produces
different outcomes in different courtrooms in substantially similar cases. As
a result, some circuit courts are regarded as "pro-patent" and other[s] "anti-
patent," and much time and money is expended in "shopping" for a
favorable venue. In a Commission survey of practitioners, the patent bar
reported that uncertainty created by the lack of national law precedent was a
significant problem; the Commission found patent law to be an area in
which widespread forum-shopping was particularly acute. 204
The creation of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals seems to have
effectively increased the consistency of patent law, as there is now one single
forum for patent appeals. 20 5 It, however, has not prevented patent plaintiffs
from filing suit in strategic venues with few, or no, connections to the case in
order to benefit from desirable local rules, experienced judges, or open-
handed juries. 206 This forum-shopping that remains, therefore, increases the
likelihood that the forum chosen by the plaintiff will be inconvenient to the
defendant and the witnesses-the location of the court with the most
favorable patent rules may not be anywhere near the location of the witnesses
or evidence-and will thus cause the defendant to file a motion to transfer
201 In the Eastern District of Texas, patent cases tried to a judge take, on average,
22.3 months as compared to a 37.8 month nationwide average; patent cases tried to a jury
take 21.1 months in the Eastern District as opposed to 27.1 months nationwide. Id.
2 0 2 Id. at 206, 210.
203 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(1982).
204 H.R. REP. No. 97-312, at 20-21 (1981) (footnotes omitted); see also S. REP. NO.
97-275, at 5 (1981).
205 See Serco Servs. Co. v. Kelley Co., 51 F.3d 1037, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ("The
creation of this court has in large part tempered the impact of traditional forum shopping
in patent cases .... ).
206 See Leychkis, supra note 198, at 206.
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venue. If the defendant's motion is denied, his best recourse is to petition the
Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus.
When entertaining a petition for mandamus in review of a transfer order,
the Federal Circuit does not apply precedent from that court, but rather the
law of the regional circuit because the petition does not contain substantive
issues of patent law. 207 Thus, when a defendant's motion to transfer venue
under § 1404(a) is denied by the Eastern District of Texas, for example, and
the defendant petitions the Federal Circuit for a writ of mandamus, the
Federal Circuit will apply the Fifth Circuit law on point.20 8 This is significant
because the post-Volkswagen II Fifth Circuit has the most liberal position
regarding when the writ of mandamus may issue to redress an abuse of
discretion on a transfer order.209 Thus, the combination of heavy forum-
shopping resulting in the filing of many cases with weak ties to the Eastern
District and liberal mandamus review in the Fifth Circuit creates an
environment in which the writ often issues in review of a district court's
transfer decision.
The simple fact that the writ of mandamus has issued in review of
transfer orders with more frequency in the patent context than in other
subsets of civil litigation, however, does not render the interests cited by the
Federal Circuit when issuing the writ-the same five interests as are
identified in the preceding subsection of this Note-inapplicable to other
forms of civil litigation.210 The interests that drive the Federal Circuit's
207 Storage Tech. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 329 F.3d 823, 836 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
208 See, e.g., In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(applying Fifth Circuit precedent to a petition for mandamus in a patent case originating
in the Eastern District of Texas).
209 The Fifth Circuit reviews transfer orders for clear abuse of discretion leading to a
patently erroneous result. See Volkswagen 11, 545 F.3d 304, 310 (5th Cir. 2008) (en
banc). To determine if the standard is met, the court carefully reviews the facts and
circumstances presented to, and the decision-making process engaged in by, the district
court in coming to its decision on the transfer motion. Id. at 312. Other circuits will not
undertake an independent review of the transfer factors considered by the district court
due to concerns that such a practice will result in the circuit court substituting its
judgment for that of the district court on a decision where the district court is granted
much discretion. See McGraw-Edison Co. v. Van Pelt, 350 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1965)
(asserting that the Eighth Circuit would not review the specific decision-making process
of the district court on a transfer motion unless it was made clear that the facts and
circumstances were "without any basis for a judgment of discretion").
210 This is made abundantly clear by the non-patent cases in which the writ of
mandamus has issued to remedy a district court's transfer order abuse of discretion. The
same interests cited in the patent cases are cited in those cases as well. See, e.g., In re
Horseshoe Entre't, 337 F.3d 429, 433-34 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing the location of evidence
and the convenience of witnesses as bases for issuing the writ in an employment
discrimination case).
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recent analysis, therefore, are at their core, trans-substantive. As the TS Tech
court noted in its discussion reversing the district court's disposition on one
of the above-identified interests, "[t]he fact that this is a patent case as
opposed to another type of civil case does not in any way make the district
court's rationale more logical .... ,,211
The five interests identified in this section provide a principled answer,
regardless of the substantive context in which the litigation is situated, to the
question: "When is mandamus appropriate to review a trial court's exercise
of discretion on a transfer motion?" In nearly every case in which a circuit
court has issued a writ to remedy a trial court's transfer order abuse of
discretion, at least one of the five interests is cited as justification for the
writ. If mandamus review is appropriate to protect these interests in one
circuit, there is no reason why it should not be appropriate in all circuits.212
The five interests, therefore, constitute a core nucleus of triggering events
that, when present, provoke mandamus review of transfer orders for abuse of
discretion.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR TRANS-JURISDICTIONAL
AVAILABILITY OF REVIEW
The interests historically guarded by mandamus review of transfer orders
for abuse of discretion bring some measure of coherence to the currently
chaotic law regarding the availability of such review. Based upon this newly
identified coherence, the present section proposes statutory language
providing for trans-jurisdictional availability of review when those, and
similarly important interests, are implicated by a ruling of a district court on
a transfer motion.
A. Statutory Triggers: Providing Trans-Jurisdictional Mandamus
Review of§ 1404(a) Orders for Abuse of Discretion
The interests commonly protected by the circuit courts on mandamus
review of transfer orders are protected for a reason: they are important. If a
party cannot access evidence due to the venue in which it is forced to litigate,
it is deprived of the opportunity to put on its best case.213 For the witnesses,
testifying in a case in which they are not a party is, at least, a minor
211 In re TS Tech, 551 F.3d at 1321.
212 None of the interests are, for example, geographically dependant. Access to
evidence is just as vital in the First Circuit as it is in the Fifth, and the need for a
community to have contacts with the litigation located within it is just as great in the
Third Circuit as it is in the Tenth.
213 See supra Part III.A. I and accompanying notes.
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inconvenience; when the trial is located in a distant venue, testifying
becomes a major, life-disrupting event. 214 Trials in venues with no
meaningful connection to the litigation, at best, impose unfair costs on the
community, and, at worst, result in panels of disinterested, apathetic
jurors.215 Facilitating judicial economy and preventing delay have long been
recognized as important goals of the federal courts. 216 And, the ability to
enter into bargains knowing that, if properly formed, they will be recognized
and enforced by the courts is central to American law.217 In the absence of
mandamus review for abuse of discretion, these interests, when given short-
shrift by a district judge on a transfer ruling, go unvindicated. 218
Not only does mandamus review of § 1404(a) orders for abuse of
discretion protect important interests, but it also reflects the ever-increasing
importance of pre-trial litigation in the life cycle of the lawsuit.219 Because
most disputes are resolved without a trial, the events and rulings leading up
to the termination of the case-whether by settlement, dismissal, or
otherwise-are necessarily more influential in the outcome of the case.220 It
follows, then, that an abuse of discretion during the pre-trial phase is also
more debilitating to an affected party.221 Thus, judicial practice and policy
214 See supra Part III.A.2 and accompanying notes.
215 See supra Part III.A.3 and accompanying notes.
216 See supra Part III.A.4 and accompanying notes.
217 See supra Part III.A.5 and accompanying notes.
218 See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also David E. Steinberg,
Simplifying the Choice of Forum: A Response to Professor Clermont and Professor
Eisenberg, 75 WASH U. L.Q. 1479, 1494-96 (1997) ("[T]ransfer decisions are virtually
immune from appellate review. District judges may decide transfer motions free from
worries about reversal, and need not justify their transfer rulings in comprehensive
opinions.").
219 See Steinberg, supra note 218, at 1506-08 (lamenting the "change in focus from
trial adjudication to pre-trial resolution").
220 See Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 494, 511 (5th Cir. 2007)
(noting the importance of pre-trial orders especially in light of FED. R. Civ. P. 16(e),
which states that pre-trial orders "shall control the subsequent course of the action unless
modified by a subsequent order"). Though Rule 16(e) applies to all pre-trial orders, it
aptly illustrates the increased importance of a transfer order under § 1404(a) in a pre-trial
focused climate. Such an order "controls" the course of the subsequent action. It
determines where the case will be litigated, who will hear it, the relative convenience of
the parties and witnesses, and the burden imposed on the local community. The
importance of pre-trial orders cannot be overstated. See supra note 6 and accompanying
text (pre-trial transfer of venue orders are potentially outcome-determinative).
221 It is true that many of the factors considered in the transfer context seem to
contemplate harms suffered only at trial. For example, what difference does it make if the
witnesses are available to testify live in the courtroom rather than by deposition if there is
no trial? It may be asked, then, if there is likely to be no trial and the case will settle out,
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should reflect the reality of modem litigation and recognize expanded review
of pre-trial orders. Specifically, transfer orders issued under § 1404(a) should
be subject to mandamus review when it is alleged that the district judge
abused her discretion in making the order.222
The interests weighing in favor of liberal mandamus review must,
however, be balanced against the interests militating in favor of restrictive
use of the writ in the transfer context. The classic arguments against
mandamus review of transfer orders for abuse of discretion have been policy
arguments relating to the avoidance of piecemeal appellate review and the
need to adhere to the final judgment rule.223 The Supreme Court, in Allied
why should an abuse of discretion on a transfer factor contemplating trial matter? See
supra note 4. Isn't this just fighting over where the case will be sent to settle or otherwise
be disposed of without trial? No. The prospect of success at trial drives settlement. See
Rivera v. Corporate Receivables, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d. 329, 334 (D. Conn. 2008) (noting
that in settlement negotiations the parties balance the risk and costs of the litigation
against the likelihood of success at trial). Thus, because venue significantly influences a
party's prospects of trial success, the terms of settlement will reflect the outcome of the
venue dispute-an outcome that may be determined by a judge's abuse of discretion on a
transfer motion. See Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1508 ("When the dust
settles, the case does too-but on terms that reflect the results of the skirmishing [over
venue].").
222 One characteristic of transfer orders that sets them apart from other pre-trial
orders and makes them especially worthy of review is that they are both potentially
outcome determinative and effectively unappealable. See Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of
Am., 408 F.2d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1969) (commenting that abuses of discretion on transfer
orders are not susceptible to correction on appeal from final judgment); Clermont &
Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1511-12 (arguing that transfer orders significantly influence
outcome).
223 See In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 180 (1st Cir. 1954) (mandamus review harms
efficiency); All States Freight v. Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1011-12 (3d Cir. 1952).
Judge Goodrich's opinion in the latter case is the classic articulation of the potential
harms of mandamus review of transfer orders for abuse of discretion. He opined that:
Instead of making the business of the courts easier, quicker and less expensive, we
now have the merits of the litigation postponed while appellate courts review the
question [of] where a case may be tried.
Every litigant against whom the transfer issue is decided naturally thinks the judge
was wrong. It is likely that in some cases an appellate court would think so, too. But
the risk of a party being injured either by the granting or refusal of a transfer order
is, we think, much less than the certainty of harm through delay and additional
expense if these orders are to be subjected to interlocutory review by mandamus.
Id. Judge Goodrich's point is well taken. However, the encouragement of efficiency in
the federal courts does not require a blanket prohibition on mandamus review under these
circumstances. It requires only that such review be reserved for truly deserving cases.
Judge Goodrich, after all, would surely not sanction the blatant devaluation of parties'
rights in order to preserve efficiency in all situations.
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Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., colorfully described its restrictive stance on
mandamus review of interlocutory orders by describing the frequency with
which writs of mandamus would issue with the refrain, "What never? Well,
hardly ever!"'224
It is undeniable that piecemeal appeal should be, if possible, avoided, and
that such a policy promotes efficiency within the federal courts. 225 However,
there is nothing talismanic about efficiency considerations, and such
considerations should acquiesce to a subordinate position in the hierarchy of
policies when in conflict with the reviewability of a potentially outcome-
determinative pre-trial order. Thus, the proposed statutory language attempts
to provide meaningful review of transfer orders for abuse of discretion while
minimizing the dilatory effect of the proposed review.
A statute is the most appropriate method by which to ensure
consequential review of orders made under § 1404(a) for abuse of discretion
for several reasons. First, the past half-century has proved that the circuit
courts are not likely to come into line with one another on the availability of
mandamus review.226 Second, it is equally unlikely that the Supreme Court
will issue a decision addressing the issue any time soon; the Court has
avoided the issue each of the last two opportunities it has had to consider it,
most recently in 2009.227 Finally, a statute will provide trans-jurisdictional
uniformity in an unsettled area of the law, thus reducing the costs imposed on
parties litigating petitions for mandamus. 228
224 The phrase "What never! Well, hardly ever!" is used in the per curium opinion
of the Supreme Court in Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980)
(discussing, generally, the use of the writ of mandamus to review the discretionary
decisions of trial courts). However, the phrase finds its origins in Gilbert and Sullivan's
opera H.MS. Pinafore. See W.S. GILBERT & ARTHuR SULLIVAN, No. 4 Recit. & Song
"My Gallant Crew, Good Morning ... I Am the Captain of the Pinafore" in H.M.S.
PINAFORE (1878), available at
http://math.boisestate.edu/gas/pinafore/webopera/pin04.html.
225 See Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 203-04 (1999) (citing
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981)) (allowing piecemeal
appeal, among other things, inhibits efficient judicial administration).
226 See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (detailing the drastic circuit split
that currently exists on the availability of mandamus to review transfer orders for abuse
of discretion).
227 See Singleton v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1336 (2009) (mem.)
(denial of petition for writ of certiorari); Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 33 (1955).
228 A statute governing the availability of mandamus review of transfer orders for
abuse of discretion will cause the costs of bringing a mandamus petition seeking such
review to decrease because it will bring clarity to this area of the law. Fewer man-hours
will be required to determine what the law on point actually is, and what the appropriate
course of action is in light of that law. See Michelle J. White, Legal Complexity and
Lawyers' Benefit from Litigation, 12 INT'L. REv. L. & ECON. 381, 382, 386 (1992)
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The following statutory language achieves the goals set out above:
(a) When it appears from the face of the record and the pleadings in support
of the petition for a writ of mandamus that as a result of a trial court's
grant or denial of a motion to transfer venue under § 1404(a) of this
Title:
(1) One or more parties is substantially prejudiced in its ability to
access important sources of proof; or
(2) The non-party witnesses are substantially inconvenienced by the
ruling; or
(3) The locality of the litigation has little or no meaningful contacts
with the controversy; or
(4) The efficient operation of the federal courts is unnecessarily
hindered; or
(5) A valid and enforceable contract between the parties is rendered
inconsequential; or
(6) The interests of justice so require
the Circuit Court shall inquire into the particular facts and circumstances
considered by the trial court in granting or denying the motion to transfer,
and if upon such inquiry, the Circuit Court finds that the District Court
clearly abused its discretion so as to produce a patently erroneous result, and
upon a showing by the petitioner that petitioner has no other means to attain
the relief desired, a writ of mandamus vacating the order of transfer or, in the
alternative, a writ of mandamus compelling transfer, shall issue.
229
This proposed statute should be located in Chapter 133 of Title 28 of the
United States Code and entitled "Writ Review of Transfer Orders." Chapter
133 is entitled "Review-Miscellaneous Provisions." 230 Under that Title and
Chapter, this statute would be § 2114. This is the most natural placement of
the statute within the Code. Other locations considered for the new section
were § 1291, § 1292(b), and § 1651.
The final judgment rule contained in § 1291 concerns general appellate
jurisdiction whereas the proposed statute addresses the mandamus
jurisdiction of the circuit courts.231 It would be confusing to mix two
(arguing that less clarity in the law increases legal complexity and that legal complexity
drives up legal fees).
229 Though this statute adopts the scope and standard of review of the Fifth Circuit,
it does so for illustrative purposes only. See Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d 304, 309-10 (5th
Cir. 2008) (en banc). As is noted, supra page 37, this Note is primarily concerned with
the question of when mandamus review should be available, and leaves the formulation
of the proper scope and standard of review for another day.
230 See 28 U.S.C. ch. 133 (2006).
231 See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
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different bases for jurisdiction in one statute. Thus, amending the final
judgment rule with this language is not the best choice. Additionally,
§ 1292(b) is not an appropriate section to amend for these purposes; that
section requires certification by a district judge that the interlocutory order
contains a controlling matter of law before interlocutory review will take
place.232 Regardless of the importance of the transfer order in the overall
outcome of the trial, an alleged abuse of discretion on such an order is not a
"controlling matter of law" in terms of the overall case, and it is unlikely that
a district judge would admit to abusing her discretion for purposes of
interlocutory appeal. 233 Likewise, § 1651 is not appropriate. It is a general
power statute, and would only be cluttered by a. provision dealing with the
use of the writ in a specific circumstance. 234 Thus, this statute seems to fit
most soundly in the Miscellaneous section. The citation of the proposed
statute would therefore be 28 U.S.C. § 2114.
This statute improves upon the current state of mandamus review of
transfer orders for abuse of discretion in several important ways. Most
importantly, it expressly provides for the availability of writ review if the
petitioning party makes the threshold showing. As long as the party
petitioning for the writ demonstrates that the ruling of a district court on a
transfer motion caused one of the enumerated injuries, the circuit court will
undertake to review the decision of the district court on the underlying
transfer motion. Currently, at least one circuit will not even grant leave to
petition for mandamus when what is claimed is that the district court abused
its discretion in ruling on a transfer motion, and a number of circuits refuse to
review the discretion of the trial judge where she has considered the
statutorily prescribed factors and decided thereon.235 Such restrictive policies
preclude the appellate courts from ever reaching the abuse of discretion
question. Thus, this statute creates a path to review that, depending on the
circuit, does not currently exist for parties injured by the decision of a district
judge on a transfer motion.
The open-ended "interests of justice" threshold factor significantly
contributes to this statute's ability to provide expanded review of transfer
orders for abuse of discretion because it provides the needed review in
circumstances not readily foreseeable, but that nonetheless implicate interests
rising to the level of those specifically enumerated in subsections (1) - (5) of
232 See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006).
233 Id; see also Roedersheimer, supra note 14, at 117.
234 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).
235 See In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 183 (1st Cir. 1954) (denying leave to file
petition except in "really extraordinary situations"); All States Freight v. Modarelli, 196
F.2d 1010, 1012 (3d Cir. 1952) (refusing mandamus review where the district judge has
considered the statutory transfer factors and made a decision).
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the statute. Thus, for example, though not expressly stated as a threshold
factor in the statute, if the ruling of a district court resulted in the transfer of
an action to a venue where one of the parties clearly could not receive a fair
and unbiased trail, the "interests of justice" threshold factor would be met:
the ruling of the district court on a transfer motion resulted in the impairment
of a party's important interest.236
Proposed § 2114 not only provides for much needed review of transfer
orders for abuse of discretion, but it does so while minimizing the damage
and delay imposed on the federal courts by piecemeal appeal. The "triggering
events" function as a screening mechanism that precludes access to
mandamus review where no real injury resulted from the ruling of the district
court. Moreover, the screening mechanism is highly selective as these
"triggering events" represent a relatively narrow set of circumstances that
will end in mandamus review of a transfer order. The "interests of justice"
factor does not significantly expand the circumstances that will provoke
review because that factor encompasses only interests that are as or more
substantial than the expressly defined "triggering events." The proposed
statute, therefore, provides review only when it is needed most-when a
litigant has already suffered injury at the hands of the court and the injury is
clearly discernable. 237 Proposed § 2114, therefore, may open wider the door
for mandamus review of transfer orders for abuse of discretion, but it does
not open the floodgates.
Nevertheless, it is true that the petition for mandamus will inject an
additional step into the litigation process and cause the case on the merits to
be postponed, but some delay must be tolerated in order to protect the
interests of all parties and ensure the fair adjudication of their rights.238 As
236 In one case the petition for a writ of mandamus to vacate an order transferring a
securities action from the Western District of Washington to the District of Arizona was
denied because the district judge did not clearly err in determining that, due to the fact
that the case was highly publicized and political, one of the parties could not receive a
fair trial in the original forum. It may be inferred from this case that had the district judge
refused to transfer the case from the prejudicial forum, mandamus would have been
appropriate to protect the party's interest in receiving a fair and unbiased trial. See Wash.
Pub. Utils. Grp. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W.D. Wash., 843 F.2d 319, 324 (9th Cir. 1987) ("A
decision whether a change of venue is compelled by pervasive prejudicial publicity
concerns an exercise of discretion."); see also L.A. Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL,
726 F.2d 1381, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1984) (declining to reverse a trial court's denial of
transfer due to pretrial publicity in the forum).
237 The injury must be "clearly discernable" because the proposed statute requires
that injury be clear from the face of the record and the pleadings in support of the petition
for mandamus. See proposed § 2114, supra Part IV.A.
238 If mandamus review were to be made available for all transfer orders, the
machinery of the federal courts would surely grind to a halt. See Brief of Civil Procedure
Law Professors, supra notes 24-27. Proposed § 2114, however, provides mandamus
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was previously noted, it is unlikely that the case will ever be adjudicated on
the merits.239 It will most likely settle or be dismissed, and the venue in
which the litigation is located substantially influences those methods of case
termination. 240 Modest delay, therefore, is a small price to pay for thoughtful
review of a potentially outcome-determinative order. 24 1
B. Tripping the Triggers: Illustrating the Operation of the Proposed
Statute
The proposed statute provides for automatic mandamus review when the
party petitioning for mandamus makes the required threshold showing.242 If
just one of the "triggers" enumerated in the statute is tripped, the appellate
court will take a closer look at the decision of the district court on the transfer
order to determine whether an abuse of discretion warranting the issuance of
the writ has occurred. 243 The impact of this statute is most easily appreciated
when the statute is applied to the facts of several cases in which mandamus
has been petitioned for and denied.
The proposed statute will have little effect on cases such as Solomon v.
Continental American Life Insurance Co. and those like it.244 In Solomon, the
plaintiffs petitioned the Third Circuit for a writ of mandamus to vacate the
review only in narrowly defined circumstances historically demonstrated to provoke the
issuance of the writ. See supra Part III.A. 1-5; proposed § 2114 supra Part W.A. Thus,
because only the most appropriate facts will be reviewed under the proposed statute, little
delay will actually result.
239 See generally BuRNs, supra note 4 (detailing the disappearance of the American
civil trial).
240 See supra note 6.
241 Whether the delay associated with mandamus review of transfer orders for abuse
of discretion is worth the benefit realized from such review is dependant upon whether, in
most cases, "the benefits of closer appellate scrutiny" outweigh "those of greater
deference." See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMoRY L.J. 747,
756 (1982). Because transfer orders under § 1404(a) have the potential to substantially
influence the outcome of the case by placing the litigation in a certain venue, the delay
associated with mandamus review of these orders for abuse of discretion is acceptable
where the threshold factors of proposed § 2114 have been met, indicating that some
injury has resulted due to the ruling of the trial judge.
242 See proposed § 2114 supra Part IV.A.
243 The scope and standard of review employed on this "closer look" will ultimately
determine whether or not the writ will issue. Though this Note does not undertake to
discuss the intricacies of these issues, I am an advocate of the Fifth Circuit's approach as
to both scope and standard of review in this context because it provides the most
meaningful and probative review possible while not slipping into full de novo review. See
supra notes 106-07, 229.
244 Solomon v. Continental Am. Life Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 1043 (3d Cir. 1973).
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order of a district judge transferring the action under § 1404(a) from the
District of New Jersey to the Middle District of North Carolina.245 The Third
Circuit did not engage in extensive mandamus review, and denied the
petition of the plaintiffs on grounds that "the transfer order falls well within
any conceivable standard for review on a mandamus petition of a § 1404(a)
order."246
The court was correct not to engage in extended mandamus review.247
The plaintiffs filed the suit in New Jersey, seeking to recover portions of a
life insurance policy providing for double indemnity or accidental death
benefits if the insured died as a result of an accident.248 Thus, whether the
decedent died as the result of an accident or other causes was the chief
issue.249 All of the non-party fact witnesses and nearly all of the evidence
relevant to that issue existed in North Carolina: the decedent resided in North
Carolina prior to his death, his death occurred in North Carolina, the medical
doctor who treated the decedent prior to his death and signed the death
certificate resided and practiced in North Carolina, the law enforcement
official who investigated the circumstances of the decedent's death and
reported thereon resided in North Carolina, and all other non-party fact
witnesses resided in North Carolina. 250 The residences of the plaintiffs were
the only facts weighing against the transfer.251
Applying the proposed statute to the facts would not compel any sort of
mandamus review-the plaintiff failed to make the required threshold
showing. The transfer did not result in either party suffering prejudice due to
inadequate or inconvenient access to evidence; the evidence was located in
the venue to which the case was transferred. The non-party witnesses were
not inconvenienced; they too were located in North Carolina. The transferee
venue had a localized interest in the dispute because the decedent resided and
died there. Transferring the action did not threaten any policies of judicial
economy or waste judicial resources. No contract between the parties was
rendered inconsequential due to the transfer. And, finally, any interests as
important as those specifically enumerated in the statute that could have
245 Id. at 1044.
246 Id. at 1046.
247 In fact, the court would not have engaged in any sort of extensive mandamus
review. Under the prevailing Third Circuit rule the court will not review the discretion of
the trial judge with mandamus "where the judge in the district court has considered the
interests stipulated in the statute and decided thereon." See All States Freight v.
Modarelli, 196 F.2d 1010, 1012 (3d Cir. 1952).
248 Solomon, 472 F.2d at 1046.
249 Id.
210 Id. at 1046-47.
251 Id. at 1047.
[Vol. 72:1
SUPER VISING DISCRETION
triggered the "interests of justice" factor were absent. The proposed statute,
therefore, would not change the outcome in cases like Solomon. Where it is
clear that the threshold factors do not exist, the petition for mandamus will be
summarily denied.
The statute would, however, allow circuit courts that presently engage in
some level of mandamus review automatically when the petition is filed to
more efficiently dispose of petitions that do not meet the threshold
requirements. For example, the Seventh Circuit, when a petition for
mandamus is filed seeking review of a district court's exercise of discretion
on a transfer motion, will engage in some mandamus review in order to
determine whether the district court's decision was so far beyond the pale of
proper judicial discretion as to be usurpative, in violation of a "clear and
indisputable legal right," or patently erroneous such that no other adequate
remedy exists.252 Proposed § 2114 would allow the Seventh Circuit and other
circuits like it to forego any review at all and simply deny the petition where
none of the statute's factors have been triggered, thus saving the resources of
the court.253
Some cases, however, present circumstances in which proposed § 2114
would compel a result different from that reached by the court that decided
the case. Northern Acceptance Trust 1065 v. Gray illustrates such a
situation.254 In that case the Ninth Circuit, following its rule established in
Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of America,255 refused to engage in mandamus
review for abuse of discretion because the district court had considered the
statutorily prescribed factors and decided thereon.256 The facts, however,
reveal that when the Central District of California ordered the case
transferred to the District of Hawaii under § 1404(a), at least one of proposed
§ 2114's factors was triggered.
252 See In re Nat'l Presto Indus., 347 F.3d 662, 663 (7th Cir. 2003). For a full
discussion of "the proper bounds of judicial discretion," see the article by Judge Henry J.
Friendly, supra note 241.
253 Other circuits that stand to benefit from proposed § 2114 in the same way as the
Seventh Circuit because some sort of mandamus review, however limited, is engaged in
upon the filing of a petition are the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Eleventh, and
District of Columbia Circuits. The following cases illustrate each circuit's willingness to
engage in some level of review when a petition is filed. See generally Volkswagen 17, 545
F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc); In re Ralston Purina Co., 726 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir.
1984); Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982
(11 th Cir. 1982); Fine v. McGuire, 433 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1970); A. Olinick & Sons v.
Dempster Bros., 365 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1966); McGraw-Edison Co. v. Van Pelt, 350 F.2d
361 (8th Cir. 1965); Lemon v. Druffel, 253 F.2d 680 (6th Cir. 1958).
254 See N. Acceptance Trust 1065 v. Gray, 423 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1970).
255 See Kasey v. Molybdenum Corp. of Am., 408 F.2d 16, 20 (9th Cir. 1969).
256 N. Acceptance Trust 1065, 423 F.2d at 654.
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Northern Acceptance Trust sued the defendant, Amfac, Inc., in the
Federal District Court for the Central District of California alleging
violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.257 Amfac filed a motion to transfer venue to the District of Hawaii, and
that motion was granted.258 Though there were some factors supporting
transfer to Hawaii, the facts did not overwhelmingly support transfer. 259 The
defendant, Amfac, had substantial business contacts with the Central District
of California, some of the meetings of Amfac's board of directors took place
in California, and "many third-party witnesses resided in California. 260
The fact that the district court in California transferred the action to
Hawaii despite the fact that "many third-party witnesses resided in
California" triggers mandamus review under proposed § 2114 because the
transfer "substantially inconvenienced" many non-party witnesses. Though
one may wonder if it is really any "inconvenience" at all to travel to Hawaii
for a trial, the potential disruptive effect that the travel may have on the day-
to-day life of the witness is just as great as the situation where the witness
travels to a less desirable location for litigation.261 Thus, proposed § 2114
will compel mandamus review of transfer orders in cases like Northern
Acceptance Trust 1065 where one or more of the statutorily prescribed
triggers is tripped, but under the present rule of the circuit no such review is
available.262
257 Id. at 653.
258 Id.
259 The facts supporting transfer were that the actions that, if proved, would support
a violation of the securities laws, allegedly took place in Hawaii; Amfac was incorporated
in Hawaii; many of the records and proxy statements of the company were prepared and
disseminated in Hawaii; some of the non-party witnesses resided in Hawaii; and the
docket of the Hawaii court was lighter. Id. at 654 n.3.
260 Id.
261 Whether witnesses are traveling to Hawaii or Beaumont, Texas, the time away
from work, home, and regular employment is an inconvenience for the purposes of
§ 1404. See In re Genentech, 566 F.3d 1338, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
262 The circuits currently most restrictive with mandamus review of transfer orders
for abuse of discretion who, like the Ninth Circuit, would be most affected by proposed
§ 2114 are the First, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. The following cases illustrate the
restrictive approach to mandamus review in those circuits. See generally Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for D. Wyo., 790 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1986); Kasey v.
Molybdenum Corp. of Am., 408 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174




The availability of mandamus to review § 1404(a) transfer orders for
abuse of discretion has been in turmoil for the past 60 years.263 The Supreme
Court has refused to address the question on multiple occasions, 264 and the
potpourri of positions taken by the circuit courts has done nothing to bring
clarity or consistency to this area of the law.265
This Note suggests that the current discord in the circuits is unnecessary.
The writ of mandamus has historically issued when the ruling of a district
court on a transfer motion has harmed one of five interests. 266 The interests
that circuit courts have historically found worthy of protection through the
issuance of a writ are: the parties' ability to conveniently access sources of
proof, the convenience of the witnesses, the local interest in and connection
to the litigation, judicial economy, and the enforcement of an otherwise valid
contract between the parties.267 These interests present a theme around which
this unsettled area of the law may be organized. One way, therefore, to bring
organization and consistency to this area of the law is to statutorily expand
the availability of mandamus review for transfer orders where it is alleged
that the trial judge abused his discretion when ruling on the transfer motion
and one of the five historically protected interests, or an interest of
comparable value, is implicated.268 Such a statutory expansion of mandamus
review recognizes the potentially outcome-determinative nature of venue in
the larger litigation picture as well as the historical practices of the circuit
courts while refusing to provide a brand of mandamus review that would
significantly impede the operation of the federal courts.
Therefore, proposed § 2114, or a similar statute, should be enacted to
ensure that orders issued under § 1404(a) are uniformly reviewable by
mandamus for abuse of discretion. Such a statute is a necessary, effective,
and minimally intrusive mechanism for supervising the discretion of the
district courts exercised on § 1404(a) transfer orders.
263 See supra notes 21-23.
264 See supra note 227.
265 See supra notes 113-14 (setting out the various positions taken by the circuit
courts).
266 See supra Part III.A. 1-5.
267 Sd.
268 See supra Part IV.A.
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